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Through the Lens of Pater-Americanism: A Comparative Analysis of the Eisenhower 
Administration’s Perception of Guatemala and Bolivia, 1953 and 1954 
Chapter 1 
 Poverty, harsh labor conditions, a marginalized indigenous sector, and an 
unfair distribution of wealth and resources characterized Guatemala in 1944.  Middle-
class professionals and workers came together to set off the first stages of th  
Guatemalan Revolution.  Overthrowing the Ubico dictatorship, a vocal sector of this 
coalition demanded action.  In 1953 and 1954, the government of Jacobo Guzmán 
Arbenz carried Guatemala into the next stages of this revolution.  The nationalist, 
reformist government of Arbenz initiated new reforms and realized earlier p ograms.  
These efforts included educational programs, expropriation of international export
industries, and agrarian reform. 
 From the United States, the Eisenhower Administration observed the 
Guatemalan Revolution within the framework of a developing Cold War strategy.  
These policymakers refused to support the Guatemalan Revolution, for the 
Eisenhower Administration characterized Arbenz as a communist puppet and the 
Guatemalan government as communist infiltrated.  US officials denied economic 
assistance to Guatemala while discouraging other Latin American countries from 
providing aid or support to Arbenz.  After further inquiries and diplomatic 
discussions, the Eisenhower Administration would ultimately provide resources to 
counterrevolutionaries and covertly instigate a coup.  These policies provide a 
2 
dramatic contrast with those the Eisenhower Administration followed towards Bolivia 
in the same time period. 
 In 1953 and 1954, the government of Víctor Paz Estenssoro carried Bolivia 
into the next stages of its revolution.  Middle-class professionals and workers came 
together in 1952 to set off the first stages of the Bolivian Revolution.  Undermining 
the oligarchy, a vocal sector of this coalition demanded action.  Poverty, harsh labor 
conditions, a marginalized indigenous sector, and an unfair distribution of wealth and 
resources characterized this Latin American country.  In response to such demands, 
the nationalist, reformist government of Paz initiated new reforms and fulfilled earlier 
programs.  These efforts included educational programs, expropriation of 
international export industries, and agrarian reform. 
 From the United States, the Eisenhower Administration observed the Bolivian 
Revolution within the framework of a developing Cold War strategy.  These 
policymakers initially refused to support the Bolivian Revolution, for the Eisenhower 
Administration characterized Paz as a communist puppet and the Bolivian 
government as communist infiltrated.  US officials denied economic assistance to 
Bolivia while discouraging other Latin American countries from providing or support 
to Paz.  After further inquiries and diplomatic discussions, the Eisenhower 
Administration would ultimately provide invaluable resources to the Bolivian 
government that would prop up the Paz government and push forward many of the 
reforms of the Bolivian Revolution. 
3 
 The Eisenhower Administration’s defiant reaction to the Arbenz government 
in Guatemala and accommodating response to the Paz government in Bolivia have 
received the attention of students of US-Latin American relations and Latin American 
history.1  The governments of both Latin American countries, as expressed above, 
shared numerous attributes.  Kenneth Lehman succinctly describes the similarities: 
Both advanced similar modernizing reform programs and drew support from analogous 
coalitions of disgruntled workers, the urban middle class, and peasants.  Both rejected the 
political elitism, sociological Eurocentrism, and export-oriented economic liberalism of the 
oligarchies that traditionally ruled their countries; both sought instead to enfranchise newly 
rising classes, further integrate native peasants into national society, and empower the state to 
redirect economic development and distribute its benefits more equitably.  Ideologically 
eclectic, they drew from Marxism but filtered it and other ideological sources through a 
national perspective, and both received Communist party support.2   
This thesis will compare the Eisenhower Administration’s perception of Guatemala 
with that of Bolivia in 1953 and 1954 to understand why the US government 
responded differently to very similar circumstances.  The Eisenhower Administration 
reacted to a nationalist, reformist government in Guatemala with covert operations 
seeking to overthrow Arbenz.  However, these same policymakers provided a 
nationalist, reformist government in Bolivia with economic assistance that would 
stabilize Paz.  Richard H. Immerman describes the US government’s reaction to the 
Arbenz government as a “test tube” or a “laboratory” for US foreign policy during the 
Cold War at a price of $20 million.3  G. Earl Sanders characterized the US 
                                                
1 As the description on page 12 and the bibliography detail, some of the more prominent authors 
include Bryce Wood, Cole Blasier, and Kenneth Lehman. 
2 Lehman (1997), 185-6. 
3 Immerman (1978), 2.  The cost derives from Schlesinger and Kinzer (2005), 111-2: One official 
“provided a budget estimate of $4.5 million, though ot ers later claimed the operation actually cost 
closer to $20 million.” 
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government’s response to the Paz government as a “quiet experiment” in US foreign
policy that received $19.5 million from the US.4 
I will argue that the Eisenhower Administration’s distinct approaches to these 
two Latin American governments in 1953 and 1954 derived from US officials’ 
discourse with and perceptions of the Latin American officials.  US officials expected 
Latin American governments and their representative officials to adhere to an 
overarching ideology of US foreign policy toward Latin America that I define as 
pater-Americanism.  This ideology defined US officials’ perceptions of Latin 
American governance and impacted US-Latin American relations for centuries.  US 
officials perceived Latin American countries as incapable of self-governance, so US 
officials believed that these governments must follow a path of modernity and 
progress set by the US.  As a result, US officials attempted to construct an 
interlocking coalition of governments, an inter-American system, spearheaded by the 
US and united against the invasion or threat of any extra-hemispheric or ideologcal 
challenge to US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. 
With this foundation, this thesis contends that the adherence and acquiescence 
of Latin American officials to the ideas behind pater-Americanism greatly influenced 
the Eisenhower Administration’s differing perceptions and reactions to the Arbenz 
and Paz governments.  Despite their similarities, the Arbenz and Paz governments 
themselves responded differently to the US government’s and its officials’ demands 
and suggestions.  The Arbenz government in Guatemala defied US policymakers’ 
                                                
4 Sanders (1976), 26; Wilkie, 48. 
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expectations that the Guatemalan government would adhere to the principles of 
hemispheric solidarity and unquestioning protection of private enterprise.  The 
Eisenhower Administration then promptly labeled the Arbenz government as 
communist infiltrated and proceeded with plans to overthrow the government.   When 
US officials shared their preoccupations of communist infiltration in Bolivia with the 
Paz government, Bolivian officials accommodated their rhetoric and appeased such 
preoccupations.  US policymakers would thus interpret the Paz government as 
supportive of US goals to prevent communist subversion and ensure hemispheric 
solidarity. 
The methodology of this thesis builds upon the assumption that a specific 
ideology informed the decisions of US policymakers in the Eisenhower 
Administration.  US officials placed the relationship between the US and Latin 
America within their particular understanding of pater-Americanism.  As will be 
described in Chapter 2, this ideology included a belief in the superiority of the US and 
the resulting responsibility for US officials to ensure that Latin American countries 
followed a ‘proper’ path of governance, progress, and modernity.  The importance of 
understanding how various ideals or an overarching ideology informs US foreign 
policy takes from the works of historians such as Michael H. Hunt and William 
Appleman Williams.5  It is upon these works that this thesis contributes to the 
                                                
5 Consider how pater-Americanism will be set within the frameworks described by Hunt and Williams.  
Williams, 9, describes how “with the rise of Jacksonian Democracy during the 1820s…Americans 
steadily deepened their commitment to the idea that democracy was inextricably connected with 
individualism, private property, and a capitalist marketplace economy,” ideals interconnected to the 
ideology of  pater-Americanism. 
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analysis of the role of ideology in US foreign policy with regard to the Eisenhower 
Administration’s responses to the Guatemalan and Bolivian governments. 
To accomplish this task, this thesis utilizes a discourse analysis to examine 
how this ideology manifested and impacted the decisions of the Eisenhower 
Administration.  In examining the statements and memos of US officials, one can 
uncover how these officials not only constructed but also justified their decisions.  
Such an analysis will shed light upon how the ideals behind pater-Americanism 
emerged.  Discourse analysis will shed light upon how Eisenhower officials perceived 
the Guatemalan and Bolivian governments through a lens defined by the rhetoric, 
tone, and symbols informed by pater-Americanism.  A discourse analysis will provide 
for an assessment of how the ideology of US foreign policy toward Latin America 
influenced and determined the differing approaches of the Eisenhower Administration 
toward the Arbenz and Paz governments.6 
This thesis incorporates primary materials from the Eisenhower Library.  The 
materials derive from the discussions of the Eisenhower Administration and the 
National Security Council, primarily those concerning the Administration’s policy in 
both Guatemala and Bolivia.  The discourse analysis of this thesis utilizes thes 
materials to take a deeper look into how Eisenhower officials made discussions about 
US foreign policy toward Latin America.  The primary materials thus allow for an 
examination into how the Eisenhower Administration approached the Arbenz and Paz 
                                                
6 See the overview on critical discourse analysis in Teun A. Van Dijk’s “Critical Discourse  Analysis” 
and on political discourse in John Wilson’s “Political Discourse” in The Handbook of Discourse 
Analysis, ed. Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2001), 352-71 and 398-415 respectively. 
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governments.  I will argue that it was less the actions of the Arbenz and Paz 
governments that determined US responses than it was how they talked about their 
actions and attitudes with US officials.  Thus, it was the discourse that specifically 
resulted in the differing US policies toward the two governments. 
This thesis focuses upon US officials’ perceptions of the Guatemalan and 
Bolivian governments.  Discourse analysis serves to highlight how Guatmalan and 
Bolivian officials appeared to have maneuvered around the expectations of 
Eisenhower officials and within the ideology of pater-Americanism.  A more 
penetrating analysis of the leadership of the two Latin American governments and the 
reasons for their actions, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis.  Through the 
primary documents and secondary materials, this thesis strives to contribute to the 
analysis of US foreign policy to Latin America. 
This thesis’ exploration is based on the foundations of numerous other works.  
The need to evaluate and understand the ideologies and perceptions of US 
policymakers is best articulated by Michael H. Hunt in Ideology and U.S. Foreign 
Policy, “Ideologies are important because they constitute the framework in which 
policymakers deal with specific issues and in which the attentive public understands 
those issues.  For both groups, ideologies elucidate complex realities and reduce them 
to understandable and manageable terms.”7  Hunt provides an insightful description 
                                                
7 (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1987), 16.  However, the analysis of an overarching ideology must be 
tempered by a flexible understanding of what might be considered nonideological factors, as Hunt 
elucidates, “It is important, to begin with, to accept the view that the relationship between ideas and 
action is not rigid.  The simple idea or set of ideas on which a policy may initially rest invariably has to 
leave room for diverse nonideological considerations, such as a need for access to export markets and 
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of how racism and revolution have impacted US foreign policy toward Latin 
America.8  I strive in this thesis to contribute to such work by identifying pater-
Americanism and expanding upon this ideology by describing how it informed the 
Eisenhower Administration’s perceptions of the Arbenz and Paz governments. 
The analysis of US foreign policy and ideology in US-Latin American 
relations has received numerous contributions.  One of the most expansive and 
thorough texts is Fredrick B. Pike’s The United States and Latin America: Myths and 
Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature.9  Pike explores how US citizens have defined 
Latin Americans in terms of racist, childish, and uncivilized stereotypes and cl rifies 
how US officials have taken the ideologies of US national greatness and Lati  
American’s inability to achieve order and modernity as justifications for presenting 
the US as the hemisphere’s guardian.  This idea of US supervision over Latin 
America’s internal affairs and pursuit of modernity also serves as the foundation for 
other invaluable texts on US-Latin American relations and ideology.  Lars Schoultz in 
Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America p ovides a 
broad overview of these paternalistic ideals.10  The foundations for US-Latin 
American relations are uncovered in the case studies included within the companion 
volumes United States-Latin American Relations, 1800-1850: The Formative 
                                                                                                                                          
raw materials, preservation of essential national security, attention to the preferences of the electorate, 
and even the promptings of personal political ambitions” (16).  This thesis attempts to find such a 
balance, as the bibliography will explain. 
8 Hunt, Chapters 3 and 4, esp. 58-68. 
9 Austin, TX: U of Texas P, 1992. 
10 Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1998. 
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Generations, edited by T. Ray Shurbutt,11 and United States-Latin American 
Relations, 1850-1903: Establishing a Relationship, edited by Thomas M. Leonard.12  
The exploration of the Good Neighbor Policy in Bryce Wood’s The Making of the 
Good Neighbor Policy13 and Fredrick B. Pike’s FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty 
Years of Generally Gentle Chaos14 also contributes to the scholarship in US foreign 
policy toward Latin America up to the Cold War.  The intersection between the 
ideology of US-Latin American relations and the ideological conflict of the Cold War 
benefits from the work of scholars such as that of Jorge I. Domínguez’s “US-Latin 
American Relations during the Cold War and its Aftermath”15 as well as the dynamic 
work in the exploration of the Cold War’s impact upon the Third World in Odd Arne 
Westad’s The Global Cold War.16 
The works on the foreign policy of Eisenhower and his officials are essential 
to this thesis.  The discussion of containment derives primarily from John Lewis 
Gaddis’s Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National 
Security Policy during the Cold War.17  A diverse array of scholars has contributed 
works to illuminate the intricacies of the Eisenhower Administration’s foreign policy.  
Blanche Wiesen Cook’s The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy of Peace 
                                                
11 Tuscaloosa, AL: U of Alabama P, 1991. 
12 Tuscaloosa, AL: U of Alabama P, 1999. 
13 New York, NY: Norton, 1967. 
14 Austin, TX: U of Texas P, 1995. 
15 In The United States and Latin America: The New Agenda (Cambridge, MA: David Rockefeller 
Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard U, 1999), 33-50. 
16 New York, NY: Cambridge UP, 2007. 
17 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Oxford UP, 2005). 
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and Political Warfare18 and Robert R. Bowie’s and Richard H. Immerman’s Waging 
Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy19 have helped me 
better understand Eisenhower’s approach to foreign policy.  Works which have 
provided insight into the Eisenhower Administration’s foreign policy in general and 
to Latin America include Stephen G. Rabe’s Ei enhower and Latin America: The 
Foreign Policy of Anticommunism,20 W.W. Rostow’s Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Foreign Aid,21 and Burton I. Kaufman’s Trade and Aid: Eisenhower’s Foreign 
Economic Policy, 1953-1961.22 
Numerous authors have expanded the scholarship into US involvement in the 
Guatemalan Revolution and the coup of Arbenz, some focusing upon realist and 
nonideological factors and others exploring how Guatemala appeared within the 
context of US-Latin American relations.  The argument that the Eisenhower 
Administration believed its actions served to undermine a communist infiltrated 
government are best represented in Richard H. Immerman’s The CIA in Guatemala: 
The Foreign Policy of Intervention.23  Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer 
highlight in Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala24 the links 
between the United Fruit Company and the Eisenhower Administration.  Piero 
Gleijeses’ Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-
                                                
18 Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981. 
19 New York, NY: Oxford UP, 1998. 
20 Chapel Hill, NC: U of North Carolina P, 1988. 
21 Austin, TX: U of Texas P, 1985. 
22 Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins UP, 1982. 
23 Austin, TX: U of Texas P, 1982.  This text builds upon Immerman’s dissertation Guatemala and the 
United States (1978). 
24 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard U, 2005). 
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1954 contributes interviews with Arbenz’s wife and other officials, discusses in detail
the character of the Arbenz government, and explores how the actions and rhetoric of 
Guatemalan and US officials interacted within the Cold War.25 
 The scholarship on the Bolivian Revolution has immensely contributed to this 
thesis.  James M. Malloy’s Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution,26 James 
Dunkerley’s Rebellion in the Veins: Political Struggle in Bolivia, 1952-82,27 and 
Herbert S. Klein’s Bolivia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society28 investigate the 
revolution’s origins as well as its contributions to the fabric of Bolivian society.  The 
scholarship of the Bolivian Revolution generally includes analyses surrounding the 
US government’s role and influence in the Paz government’s actions following 1952.  
These analyses revolve around many individuals’ disappointment with the Bolivian 
Revolution and the casting of blame upon US interference and limitations imposed 
upon Paz and Bolivian officials.  Some important examples include Beyond the 
Revolution: Bolivia since 1952, edited by James M. Malloy and Richard S. Thorn,29 
with Cole Blasier’s “The United States and the Revolution,” Modern-Day Bolivia: 
Legacy of the Revolution and Prospects for the Future, edited by Jerry R. Ladman,30 
with Cornelius H. Zondag’s “Bolivia’s 1952 Revolution: Initial Impact and U.S. 
Involvement” and James W. Wilkie’s “U.S. Foreign Policy and Economic Assistance 
                                                
25Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1991.  Many scholars pose caution when considering the interviews, for 
the interviews might overstate Arbenz’s links to inter ational communism which is an important 
feature of Gleijeses’ work. 
26 Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 1970. 
27 London: Verso, 1984. 
28 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Oxford UP, 1992). 
29 Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 1971. 
30 Tempe, AZ: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State U, 1982. 
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in Bolivia, 1948-1976,” and Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative 
Perspective, edited by Merilee Grindle and Pilar Domingo,31 with Ken Lehman’s 
“Braked but not Broken: The United States and Revolutionaries in Mexico and 
Bolivia.”  Other texts which have investigated the US government’s impact on 
Bolivia and the Bolivian Revolution include James W. Wilkie’s The Bolivian 
Revolution and U.S. Aid since 1952: Financial Background and Context of Political 
Decisions,32 Cole Blasier’s “The United States, Germany, and the Bolivian 
Revolutionaries (1941-1946),”33 G. Earl Sanders’s “The Quiet Experiment in 
American Diplomacy: An Interpretative Essay on United States Aid to the Bolivian 
Revolution,”34 Kenneth D. Lehman’s Bolivia and the United States: A Limited 
Partnership,35 Fredrick B. Pike’s The United States and the Andean Republics: Peru, 
Bolivia, and Ecuador,36 as well as Victor Andrade’s My Missions for Revolutionary 
Bolivia, 1944-1962.37 
 The analysis of this thesis focuses on the Eisenhower Administration’s 
diverging approaches to the Arbenz government in Guatemala and the Paz 
government in Bolivia.  It both derives from and seeks to contribute to the scholarship 
on US-Latin American relations and US responses to the Guatemalan and Bolivian 
Revolutions.  Texts which have sought to explain the Eisenhower Administration’s 
                                                
31 Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2003. 
32 Los Angeles, CA: Latin American Center, U of California, Los Angeles, 1969. 
33 In The Hispanic American Historical Review 52.1 (Feb. 1972), 26-54. 
34 In The Americas 33.1 (July 1976), 25-49. 
35 Athens, GA: U of Georgia P, 1999. 
36 Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1977. 
37 Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 1976. 
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differing approaches include Cole Blasier’s The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to 
Revolutionary Change in Latin America, 1910-1985,38 Bryce Wood’s The 
Dismantling of the Good Neighbor Policy,39 and Kenneth Lehman’s “Revolutions and 
Attributions: Making Sense of Eisenhower Administration Policies in Bolivia and 
Guatemala.”40 
This thesis strives to complement these texts with its own analysis of the role 
of ideology in US foreign policy toward Latin America and the Eisenhower 
Administration’s conception of an inter-American system.  Blasier (1985) writes, 
“Familiarity with John Foster Dulles’ personal and political objectives [is] es ential to 
understanding the Guatemalan intervention of 1954.  Dulles’ policies toward 
Guatemala were in part a religious crusade against atheistic communism, in part an 
ideological struggle on behalf of free enterprise, and in part a political battlewith 
Soviet expansionism.”  Blasier (1985) here articulates that an understanding of this 
influential US official’s ideological sentiments is necessary for an understanding of 
the Guatemalan intervention, such as why Dulles and other US officials refused to 
believe that the Guatemalan government was not communist oriented.41  US officials 
initially perceived that both the Arbenz government and the Paz government were 
communist influenced or oriented.  US officials in the Eisenhower Administration 
witnessed two Latin American governments engage in agrarian reform, export-
industry nationalization, and educational reforms.  Furthermore, Blasier (1985) 
                                                
38 2nd ed. (Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 1985). 
39 Austin, TX: U of Texas P, 1985. 
40 In Diplomatic History 21.2 (Spring 1997), 185-213. 
41 Blasier (1985), 229. 
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explains that “United States policies promoted a relatively stable government in 
Bolivia friendly to the United States…” while the US pursued retroactive policies n 
Guatemala where “the Guatemalan revolutionaries would have welcomed 
compromise.”42  This thesis argues that the differences in US responses to these two 
governments emerged in great part from the ideological predispositions of 
Eisenhower officials which determined how US policymakers interpreted both the 
‘challenging’ and the ‘accommodating’ orientations, rhetoric, and actions of the two 
Latin American countries.  This thesis argues that the inability of the Eisenhower 
Administration and the Arbenz government to reach a suitable ‘compromise’ resulted 
from US officials’ adherence to pater-Americanism and Guatemalan officials’ refusal 
to comply with US officials’ expectations. 
This thesis also explores the ideological orientation of Eisenhower officials.  
Both Blasier (1985) and Wood (1985) highlight how the Dulles brothers and 
Eisenhower appeared to have been more active in US policy toward Guatemala while 
lower-level officials constructed US policy toward Bolivia.43  Building upon these 
arguments, this thesis explores how these officials maneuvered within an overarching 
foreign policy ideology and within the same administration while pursuing individual 
agendas.  Because US officials would interpret the actions and attitudes of 
Guatemalan and Bolivian officials within the framework of pater-Americanism, 
dissimilar responses to the two governments would emerge from the Eisenhower 
Administration. 
                                                
42 Blasier (1985), 228. 
43 Blasier (1985), 224-6; Wood (1985), Chapter 9, especially 146-50. 
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In Martha L. Cottam’s Images & Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin 
America,44 the author argues that US officials’ and their construction of US foreign 
policy toward Latin America drew upon preconceived images of dependency.  US 
officials expected Latin American countries to adhere and conform to US deman s.  
In a brief discussion of the differing US responses to the Guatemalan and Bolivian 
governments, Cottam highlights how the Arbenz government’s programs conflicted 
with US images of a dependent ‘banana republic,’ resulting in the US hostile reaction.  
On the other hand, US officials responded positively to the Paz government’s 
eventual compliance with US demands and anticommunist policy.  Cottam writes, 
“The power of the dependent image…produced a U.S. predisposition to act in a 
coercive manner…because nationalism was not a part of the dependent image.”45 
However, Cottam then writes that the cases of Guatemala and Bolivia “also 
demonstrate the extent to which an image can be divorced from political ideology.  
Images are not political formulas; they are organizing devices, shells without 
ideological content.”  Because Bolivian officials presented its leftist influences apart 
from communist infiltration, the Paz government received US support.46  This thesis 
expands upon Cottam’s arguments by exploring US ideology and how US responses 
to both nationalist, reformist governments actually fell within the overarching 
ideology of US policy toward Latin America.  This thesis argues that, for Eisenhower 
officials, the dependent image described by Cottam rested firmly on pater-
                                                
44 Pittsburgh, PA: U of Pittsburgh P, 1994. 
45 Cottam, 53. 
46 Cottam, 53. 
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Americanism and a Latin American government’s role in an inter-American system.  
The ‘dependency’ of Latin American governments expected by US officials during 
the Eisenhower Administration resulted from these officials’ observance of pater-
Americanism.  This thesis thus provides further scholarship into the idea of 
‘dependency’ with relation to US officials and Latin American governments in the 
ideology of US foreign policy. 
This exploration into US responses to Guatemalan and Bolivian revolutionary 
governments also builds on Robert A. Pastor’s Not Condemned to Repetition: The 
United States and Nicaragua.47  In the text, Pastor analyzes the various stages and 
developments in US foreign policy toward Nicaragua as well as Cuba.  Pastor’s 
scholarship focuses upon how the US adhered to a status quo of Latin American 
compliance and non-revolutionary, even non-reformist, policies.  US policymakers, 
while remaining fairly static in terms of their goals, maneuvered to retain the status 
quo, and US officials’ hesitance to adapt to challenges to the status quo resulted in 
misunderstanding and hostility between the US and Latin American countries.  This 
thesis’ attempts to grasp Eisenhower officials’ mentality and understanding of Latin 
America grows from such scholarship into US-Latin American relations.  I argue that 
the inability of US officials, such as those of the Eisenhower Administration, to 
understand revolutionary change and self-governance in Latin America derives from 
US policymakers’ adherence to pater-Americanism. 
                                                
47 Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002. 
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Chapter Two describes pater-Americanism.  US officials perceived Latin 
Americans as incapable of self-governance.  US policymakers thus believed that they 
had a responsibility to ensure that Latin American countries would follow a path of 
modernity and progress in line with the US model of governance.  Building upon 
these perceptions, US officials organized the Latin American countries as a 
hemispheric bloc to deter the ‘invasion’ of extra-hemispheric threats, such as fascism 
and communism.  US policymakers assumed that Latin American countries would 
appreciate and benefit from US assistance and trade as the US sought to lead Latin 
America during the Cold War. 
Chapter Three details the Eisenhower Administration’s construction of its 
foreign policy toward Latin America at the onset of the Cold War.  The Eisenhower 
Administration sought to strengthen the coalition of countries opposed to the advance 
of the Soviet Union and international communism.  As Eisenhower officials discussed 
the Latin American countries, their objectives remained entrenched in pater-
Americanism.  US policymakers would thus implement a policy toward Latin 
America designed to revitalize the benefits of hemispheric solidarity, resou ces, and 
increased trade. 
Chapter Four explores the history of US officials’ perceptions of the 
Guatemalan Revolution between 1944 and 1951.  The initial leaders of the 
Guatemalan Revolution maneuvered to placate US officials’ expectations of the 
banana republic’s orientation.  Under the leadership of Juan José Arévalo, the country 
took its first steps toward establishing a government that stepped outside the 
18 
boundaries of Latin American governance set by US policymakers.  These first 
breaches against pater-Americanism would influence the policies implemented by he 
Eisenhower Administration. 
Chapter Five argues that the Eisenhower Administration interpreted the 
Guatemalan government under Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán as deviating from its US-
approved role within pater-Americanism.  Eisenhower officials expected the Arbenz 
government to realize its set responsibilities to the Western Hemisphere.  These
responsibilities entailed removing communist agents and providing a safe 
environment for private investment.  When US officials expressed their concerns to 
the Arbenz government, Guatemalan officials refused to capitulate.  The Arbenz 
government sought to determine its own vision of governance without conforming to 
pater-Americanism.  Eisenhower officials, therefore, distinguished the Arbenz 
government as a threat to an inter-American system and US hegemony in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
Chapter Six introduces the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) 
and its emergence as a challenge to US officials and the inter-American system.  
From 1941 to 1951, the MNR and its leadership would grapple with various conflicts 
with US officials.  Originating as a voice defying Bolivian compensation to Standard 
Oil and as a proponent of fascism, the MNR would quickly face external pressure 
from US officials.  The MNR leadership would utilize these experiences with the US 
government when the Bolivian Revolution began. 
19 
Chapter Seven contends that the Eisenhower Administration’s assistance to 
the Bolivian Revolution and the Paz government resulted from the MNR leadership’s 
manipulation of pater-Americanism.  Upon seizing power, the Paz government 
espoused the principles of hemispheric solidarity and private investments.  Such 
rhetoric adhered to the expectations of US officials under pater-Americanism.  Those 
officials who interpreted the Arbenz government as operating outside the confines o  
an inter-American system would judge the Paz government as a suitable Latin 
American government.  The Eisenhower Administration’s decision to support the Paz 
government rested how the Paz government maneuvered within pater-Americanism. 
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Chapter 2 
Foundations for a ‘New’ Policy: Pater-Americanism 
 The Eisenhower Administration and its officials would bring Latin America 
into US Cold War policy in 1953 and 1954, but their labors built upon an ideology of 
US foreign policy toward Latin America.  From Independence to World War II, US 
officials would incorporate ideas of superiority and paternalism into US foreign 
policy toward Latin America, providing the foundation for pater-Americanism.  
When Eisenhower officials sought to reinvigorate the inter-American system of 
World War II, these US policymakers drew upon a history of US-Latin American 
relations and the ideals defining pater-Americanism. 
 The American Revolution represented for US officials the origins of their 
country’s ‘great’ destiny to develop along a path apart from that of the European 
powers and the Old World.  By the 20th Century, US officials had instilled important 
tenets of national greatness into US foreign policy and their perceptions of Latin 
American countries.  In the face of foreign powers and Old World crusades, US 
officials argued that their country had a responsibility to protect the New World from 
the malicious influence of extra-hemispheric powers.  US officials articula ed policies 
founded in a belief in the righteousness of US foreign policy to represent and expand 
liberty in the Western Hemisphere.48 
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21 
 US foreign policy toward Latin America would center upon this ‘vision of 
national greatness’ as well as a belief in the racial supremacy of US civilization.  
From their first arrival in the United States to the pursuit of territorial expansion, 
American men justified their domination over the ‘lesser,’ ‘uncivilized’ races and 
their expansion westward upon “the unquestionable superiority of civilization and its 
total rights not only over nature but also over such slaves of nature [such] as women, 
Indians, and also blacks.”49  Americans would demean Latin Americans by invoking 
the same characteristics that justified American expansionism over Native Americans.  
These races, according to many Americans, suffered from their inability to conquer 
nature as well as their refusal to embrace science, rationality, and civilization.  Well 
into the twentieth century, US officials continued to believe that American racial 
superiority over Latin Americans was a legitimate justification fr US hegemony in 
the Americas.50 
 US foreign policy toward Latin America in the twentieth century would build 
upon Americans’ differentiation between their ‘civilized’ revolution and Latin 
America’s ‘uncontrolled’ wars of independence.  Beginning with the Haitian 
Revolution in 1791, the US witnessed Latin American revolutions and independence 
movements with fear and contempt.  From their observance of the Haitians’ massacre 
of French slaveowners to the betrayals of Latin American independence heroes to the 
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resulting despotism in the region, US officials concluded that Latin Americans were 
ill-equipped for self-governance.51 
 The Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary were the basis for an 
emerging foreign policy ideology founded on US national greatness and racial 
superiority.  In 1823, President James Monroe stated in his annual message that the 
newly independent Latin American countries were no longer European subjects and 
that the European powers had no authority to intervene in the Western Hemisphere.  
Voicing the sentiments of many US officials, Monroe explained that the American 
New World was far too different from the European Old World.  US officials 
criticized Europe for trying to influence the New World, and they constructed one of 
the first policies to place the US as a guardian over the Western Hemisphere.52  US 
imperialism in the Caribbean at the end of the nineteenth century frequently 
intersected with a more aggressive application of the Monroe Doctrine.  During his 
administration between 1901 and 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt built upon the 
Monroe Doctrine in declaring that the US had a right to intervene in Latin America.  
The Roosevelt Corollary epitomized many US officials’ sentiments on US foreign 
policy toward Latin America; it was the responsibility of the US to ensure that 
‘internecine conflicts’ in Latin America would not disrupt growing trade and US 
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investments in the region and to protect the region’s peoples from their own 
misfortunes.53 
 The inter-American system of World War II grew from the Good Neighbor 
Policy.  President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) and his administration initially 
faced great criticism from Latin American countries due to US imperialism in the 
region.  Many US officials equated declining US influence in the region with this 
growing discontent.  FDR feared that such divisions would prevent Latin American 
countries from adhering to a US-championed vision of capitalist modernity.  FDR 
renounced US interventionism, revoked the Platt Amendment in Cuba, and made 
personal visits to Latin America.  He set the Good Neighbor Policy in motion and 
provided a positive spin to US foreign policy toward Latin America.54 
 The inter-American system materialized from US officials’ work under th  
Good Neighbor Policy.  Seizing upon Latin American officials’ appreciation of the 
Good Neighbor Policy, US policymakers constructed “an effective juridical network 
of collective security arrangements, peacemaking machinery, liberal trade 
arrangements and cultural exchanges to infuse new life into the inter-American 
system.”55  The inter-American system encouraged Latin American governments to 
seek out private investment to develop their economies.  Making their countries’ 
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resources available to foreign investors, Latin American governments would pave the 
way for the progress and modernity represented by US capitalism.  Latin American 
governments also entered into mutual security arrangements with the US and came 
together with the US on the international stage.  In return for this hemispheric 
solidarity and the investment opportunities for US business, the US government 
promised to defend the region from any extra-hemispheric threats and encourage its 
citizens to invest in Latin America. 
 World War II typified the ideals of the inter-American system.  The US and 
Latin American countries displayed hemispheric solidarity against European fascism.  
Brazilian and Mexican soldiers stood alongside US troops, and the US deployed 
military advisors to establish bases in Latin America.56  For the US, Latin America’s 
strategic importance derived from the need for the US to secure transportation 
channels, such as the Caribbean, to obtain indispensable resources from the region.  
In return for their support of US programs, Latin American countries received 
significant economic assistance.  This assistance included increased trade between the 
US and the Latin American countries.  Other aid came in the form of Lend-Lease 
programs and protection from the invasion of European fascism.57  The inter-
American system provided invaluable aid to the Allies’ war efforts and would remain 
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indispensable to US foreign policy officials’ conception of US-Latin American 
relations in later years. 
 The inter-American system represented more than a system of security and 
trade agreements; it was entrenched in pater-Americanism, the ideology of US 
foreign policy toward Latin America.  Building upon the ideology of US foreign 
policy toward Latin America, US policymakers continued to insist that their country 
had a responsibility to protect Latin America and ensure the region’s progress.  In 
constructing the ‘network of agreements’ between the US and Latin American 
countries, US officials sought to bind the region to the US and to guarantee US 
preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.  US economic aid would guide Latin 
America along a path of liberal economic development.  US military assist nce would 
defend the region against any international threats to growing US hegemony and the 
hemisphere’s pursuit of a vision of ‘capitalist modernity.’  Increased tradewould tie 
the future of Latin America to the US.  This ideology behind the inter-American 
system, pater-Americanism, served to reinforce US officials’ long-standing 
assumptions of US national greatness and racial superiority.  US officials believed it 
was their responsibility to lift up its southern neighbors as long as those neighbors 
recognized the US role as their guardian. 
 With the end of World War II, the Truman Administration developed the 
policy of containment that sought to limit the expansion of the Soviet Union.  US 
officials feared that the USSR offered an alternative form of progress and modernity 
that challenged the rising preeminence of the US.  US policymakers argued that, 
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without positioning itself against the influence of the USSR and the spread of 
international communism, the ‘American’ way of life and the country’s freedoms 
would be destroyed.  As a result, US officials asserted that the Third World, including 
Latin America, would have to stand against the USSR and alongside the US.58  For 
foreign policy experts, such as the ‘founder’ of containment theory, George Kennan, 
the Cold War was focused on US efforts to generate alliances and limit communist 
influence.59  With the US and the USSR holding divergent interests with regard to 
security, geopolitics, and progress, the US characterized the USSR and inter ational 
communism as threats to its national security and international development.60 
 In order to construct this balance of power, US policymakers emphasized 
alliances with countries that would support the US view.  Policy officials posited that 
the US struggle against Soviet expansionism rested upon a multilateral framework 
resembling the Allies’ efforts during World War II.61  Similar to US efforts during 
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World War II, containment recognized the importance of populations, natural 
resources, and peripheral countries as tools to combat subversive international threats, 
the USSR and international communism.62 
 In order to address these challenges in late 1950, the Truman Administration 
constructed NSC-68.63  NSC-68 was developed in 1950 in order to determine how to 
incorporate containment into US foreign policy.  Due to the international challenges 
as well as domestic dilemmas concerning the adaptability and applicability of 
containment, NSC-68 sought to “systematize containment, and to find the means to 
make it work.”64  The authors of NSC-68 articulated that the responsibility of the US 
was to deter Soviet aggression and expansion, ensuring that containment would 
remain the priority in US foreign policy.  In its declaration of Soviet intentions to 
spread communism into the Third World, NSC-68 reflected US officials’ growing 
concern that Latin American countries might deviate from their prescribed ol  within 
US policy.65  As Latin America entered into the framework of foreign policy for the 
Cold War, those US officials responsible for implementing policies of containment 
familiarized themselves with the value of containment in the crusade against 
international communism, yet these officials shared little knowledge of or expei nc  
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in Latin America.66  Experts on Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, these officials 
projected these experiences to make conclusions about Latin America.  They decided 
that international communism threatened the world and now Latin America.67 
 As the ideology of anti-communism further dominated US foreign policy 
toward Latin America, Truman policymakers turned to the inter-American system of 
World War II.68  US policymakers believed that Latin American countries would 
fulfill their prescribed functions in US foreign policy.  To combat global communism, 
such as the threat that would later face South Korea, these officials expected that 
Latin American countries would contribute to US-led actions and UN forces.  The 
Truman Administration’s emphasis upon military strength and hemispheric solidarity 
between the US and the Latin American countries is best represented in the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947.69  The Rio Treaty called upon the 
US and the Latin American countries to come together as a single bloc to defend
against external aggression. 
These Latin American countries, however, did not provide the expected 
assistance.  Under the inter-American system of World War II, the Latin American 
countries had provided invaluable resources and support to the US.  With 
communism looming over war-ravaged Eastern Europe, the US had issued the 
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Marshall Plan and its unprecedented financial assistance in order to strengthen the 
region.70  With US officials’ allocation of these resources to those countries that had 
stood against the US during World War II, Latin American countries expected that 
their participation within the inter-American system would merit similar assistance.  
US officials, however, promoted military and fiscal solutions without offering 
financial assistance for Latin American solidarity with the US.  The architect of the 
Marshall Plan, George Marshall, expressed his belief in 1948 that the Latin American 
countries would achieve stability and prosperity through private investment.71  
In response, many Latin American countries criticized the failure of the US to 
realize its promises.  Having served as allies to the US during World War II, L tin 
American countries expected reciprocation on the part of US policymakers.72  As a 
result, many Latin American countries questioned the purpose of the inter-American 
system.  Latin American countries determined that, if the US were unwilling to 
realize its own responsibilities to the inter-American system, their governments no 
longer needed to remain unquestionable followers of US policy.  These countries no  
only questioned the inter-American system but also defied pater-Americanism. 
As the Truman Administration departed, US officials’ considerations of Latin 
America remained set in Cold War strategy and pater-Americanism.  Such 
perceptions were expressed in NSC-141 in 1952.  The “intellectual last will and 
testament in this area of security policy of the Truman Administration to the 
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Eisenhower Administration,” Truman policymakers highlighted the region’s 
importance and hinted at the loss of inter-American solidarity: 
In Latin America we seek first and foremost an orderly political and economic development 
which will make the Latin American nations resistant to the internal growth of communism 
and to Soviet political war fare…Secondly, we seek hmisphere solidarity in support of our 
world policy and the cooperation of the Latin American nations in safeguarding the 
hemisphere through individual and collective defense measures against external aggression 
and internal subversion.73 
In spite of Latin American officials’ criticism of US foreign policy and international 
agreements to unite the Western Hemisphere, US policymakers adamantly insisted 
that Latin America as a hemispheric bloc must stand alongside the US in the 
ideological conflict for the hearts and minds of the Third World.74 
Eisenhower officials would afterwards seek to realize the efforts of Truman 
officials and bring Latin America and the inter-American system into the Cold War.75  
The Eisenhower Administration’s pursuit of a ‘new’ US foreign policy toward Latin 
America would build upon both the Truman Administration’s endeavors toward a 
unified Cold War foreign policy and the ideology of US foreign policy toward the 
region, pater-Americanism. 
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Chapter 3 
Missing the Inter-American System: The Eisenhower Administration and Pter-
Americanism 
 Upon assuming office, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his 
administration sought to implement a new Latin American policy.  The goal of the 
Eisenhower Administration would be to develop this policy within the framework of 
the Cold War, that is the ideological struggle between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, between the champion of democracy and the model of communism.  
Such a global contest necessitated that Eisenhower officials devise policies which 
would incorporate Latin America and US-Latin American relations into this 
international struggle. 
 Into the early 1950s, the US foreign policy of containing any international 
communist threat placed greater emphasis upon Latin America, a region which 
‘suffered’ from economic difficulties and nationalist sentiments according to the 
analyses of US policymakers.  As the Eisenhower Administration recognized an 
apparent withdrawal of many countries from the inter-American system, US 
policymakers sought to stimulate the reemergence of the more positive Pan-American 
arrangement.  The concerns, as well as the solutions, presented by Eisenhower 
officials demonstrate how these policymakers sought to bring the paternalism and 
hemispheric solidarity of pater-Americanism and afforded by the inter-American 
system of World War II into emerging policies of containment and development for 
the Cold War. 
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 The Eisenhower Administration’s formulation of policy toward Latin America 
would center upon this ideological struggle.  US officials claimed that the true pow r 
and strategy of the Soviet Union and international communism did not derive from 
military force.  Soviet expansionism drew its strength from: 
Political and economic pressure, diplomatic action in the UN and elsewhere, propaganda and 
front activities, the actions of communist parties and communist-party-controlled trade unions 
outside the [Soviet] bloc, sabotage, exploitation of subversive and revolutionary movements 
and of civil wars, and psychological warfare.76 
For Eisenhower officials, these tactics posed the greatest challenge to US influence in 
developing countries and the Third World, including Latin America.  In their view, 
the Soviet Union and international communism would exploit the weaknesses of 
nationalism and neutralism characterizing developments in many Latin American 
countries.  The intersection of weak governments, Communist organizations, and 
poverty would provide inroads for international communism in its ideological 
challenge to the US.77 
 During his campaign for the Presidency, Eisenhower discussed the importance 
of Latin America and placed blame upon the Truman Administration for having lost 
the support of Latin American countries for the inter-American system.  Eisenhowr 
claimed that the years between 1933 and 1945 were the apex of US-Latin American 
relations.  Eisenhower castigated the Truman Administration in its relations with 
Latin American following World War II.  Invaluable allies to the United States and 
instrumental to the Allied war efforts, Latin American countries received lttle 
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assistance or reciprocity for their contributions.  Eisenhower regretted that the 
Truman Administration destroyed the legacy of the Good Neighbor Policy and turned 
US-Latin American relations into “a poor neighbor policy.”  Eisenhower further 
argued that this “poor neighbor policy” led to the rise of nationalism and neutralism, 
opportunities that could be easily exploited by communists in Latin America.  
Eisenhower promised the reincorporation of the principles of the Good Neighbor 
Policy into his administration’s policy toward Latin America, although his campaign 
never touched upon how this would be accomplished.78 
 National security dictated that the Eisenhower Administration address the 
needs of Latin American countries in order to combat the appeal of international 
communism.  As these countries demanded economic progress and social betterment, 
the US had to persuade Latin American countries to steer away from the Soviet 
Union’s example.  US officials triumphed liberal trade and private investment as the 
solutions to underdevelopment.  The conservative allocation of military, technical, 
and economic assistance was intended to undermine the viability of communism for 
Latin America.79  The Eisenhower Administration’s construction of US-Latin 
American relations initially centered upon such ideas.  Eisenhower wrote in 1953, 
“Unless the free world espouses and sustains, under the leadership of America, a 
system of world trade that will allow backward people to make a decent living – even 
if only a minimal one measured by American standards – then in the long run we 
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must fall prey to the Communist attack.”80  Such a statement sheds light upon what 
became three central tenets of the Eisenhower Administration’s foreign policy toward 
Latin America.  First, US officials must ensure that liberal trade between the US and 
its allies would bring prosperity to Latin American countries and thus serve as a 
deterrent to the expansion of communism.  Second, the developing world and its 
‘backward people’ needed to follow the US example of a developed world and 
‘modern people.’  Third, and most importantly, the United States carried the 
responsibility to stand as the champion of democracy, capitalism, and modernity. 
The loss of the inter-American system and the need to ‘win back’ Latin 
America on the US side were manifest in National Security Council’s (NSC) planning 
meetings and policy documents.81  The urgency of implementing a new policy toward 
Latin America was highlighted on July 2nd, 1953 as the NSC discussed the situation 
in Korea.  The Eisenhower Administration’s discussion revolved around the Korean 
War and the expansion of international communism.  During this NSC Meeting, the 
officials contemplated an end to the Korean War and the ongoing costs.  Of these 
costs, the deployment of troops and resources faced intense criticism as the war 
progressed.  Colombia had offered to send a second group of troops to Korea, 
provided that the US would fulfill its offer to pay for the troops, and the offer came 
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under the scrutiny of one official.  The official questioned why the US would 
consider the reimbursement of the expenses for another country’s deployment of 
additional troops to Korea.  A second official responded that this reimbursement 
policy served not only “to lessen the burden on the manpower of the United States” 
but “to enhance the sense of collective responsibility” among the participating 
countries.  The first official remarked that he understood the purpose of the policy.  
However, this official then questioned why only one Latin American country, 
Colombia, “actually sent troops to Korea.”82  The US stood as the leader in an 
international war in order to deter the advancement of international communism.  
This Eisenhower official demanded that the Administration construct a more 
innovative foreign policy toward Latin America, for the Latin American countries 
were no longer standing alongside the US as they had done during World War II. 
 It is within these documents, within these discussions of relations with Latin 
America, that the Eisenhower Administration’s understanding of the principles of 
US-Latin American relations appears.  As the Eisenhower Administration sought t  
address the loss of the support of Latin American countries for US foreign policy, 
Latin America’s value and utility for the US foreign policy was framed in terms of 
the region’s resources and hope for the hemispheric solidarity provided in the inter-
American system of World War II. 
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 Eisenhower officials voiced the need to allocate US aid to Latin America, and 
their justification depended upon Latin America’s value as a source of raw materials.  
As policymakers sought to construct a balanced budget and optimize the distribution 
of aid, policymakers asserted that aid to Latin America was the means to ensure US 
access to raw resources.  During an NSC meeting, an official argued that aid no
utilized in Europe “should be used…in Latin America, where U.S. access to the 
sources of raw materials was very important.”83  At another NSC meeting, 
policymakers highlighted how reduced aid for Latin America would undermine the 
region’s “ability and willingness to make available strategic and critical materials 
needed by the United States.”84 
The debates between Eisenhower officials on aid to Latin America reflect the 
evolution of a Cold War policy toward Latin America.  Many Eisenhower officials 
challenged the efficiency and utility of the Export-Import Bank’s allocating long-term 
lending to Latin America.  As explained by officials such as Secretary of the Treasury 
George Humphrey, these individuals believed that Latin America needed to turn to 
the World Bank for long-term loans.  Since the loans from the Export-Import Bank 
came from the Treasury’s resources, Humphrey and some other Eisenhower officials 
sought to limit or even cut such aid in order to reduce spending.  In 1953, the 
Eisenhower Administration froze long-term lending.  Loans to Latin America 
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dropped from $147 million in 1952 to $7.6 million in 1953.  Latin America responded 
negatively to such reductions and felt that such action further betrayed their efforts
during World War II.  Fearing that this action curtailed hemispheric support in the
struggle against communism and its advocates, Eisenhower allowed Dulles to 
reinstate long-term lending to Latin America from the Export-Import Bank that same 
year.85 
 The Eisenhower Administration also expected Latin American countries to 
stand by the side of the US during the Cold War in a show of Pan-Americanism and 
hemispheric solidarity.  Throughout discussions touching upon Latin American 
countries’ seeming withdrawal from the inter-American system, US officials stressed 
the importance of these countries’ support at international events.  In considering th  
ramifications of decreasing aid to Latin America, policymakers emphasized inter-
American solidarity.  An official noted that any reduction in aid to the region would 
“weaken hemisphere solidarity and prejudice the cooperative role of the Latin 
American countries in hemisphere defense [and] their support of our policies in 
UN.”86  The Eisenhower Administration debated the destabilization of the Latin 
American ‘bloc’ while considering the resulting expansion of the Soviet ‘bloc.’  US 
officials’ call for a review of US policy sought to prevent the loss of the inter-
American system.  However, the Eisenhower Administration’s desire for an inter-
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American system for the Cold War merely reflected these officials’ hopes for the 
inter-American system of World War II, for raw resources and hemispheric solidarity 
in the struggle against an international threat against US ideology. 
 Due to the seeming disintegration of the inter-American system, the 
Eisenhower Administration sought a new policy toward Latin America that would 
restore the inter-American system from World War II and further pater-American 
principles.  In their search, these officials believed that a new policy toward Latin 
America would incorporate not only containment but also development.  As discussed 
earlier, the Eisenhower Administration’s national security policy entailed efforts “to 
build up the strength of the free world…to contain Soviet expansion and deter the 
Soviets from war...”  Such rhetoric derived from the policies of containment and 
NSC-68 emerging from the Truman Administration and centered upon US foreign 
policy ideology.  The “free world” and its people belonged at the side of the US. 
Moreover, one uncovers how the development of this ‘new’ policy reflected 
the ideas of development for Latin America that would define the foreign policies of 
later administrations.  The national security policy continued to argue that any 
program for Latin America would necessitate “mutual security funds (by defense 
support, military aid, and economic aid)…to help the free nations to build positions of 
strength with indigenous forces in…Latin America.”87  In order to address the 
challenges posed by and facing Latin America (the sentiments of ‘economic 
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nationalism, regionalism, neutralism, and increasing Communist influence’ noted by 
Dulles), the Eisenhower Administration looked toward developing these countries.  
As described in a memorandum written to President Eisenhower, Latin America 
suffered from “economic maladjustments” linked to the region’s history.  To remedy 
these ‘maladjustments,’ the US needed to provide “’loans …for development.’”88  As 
the concerns of Eisenhower officials demonstrate, the US government developed 
relationships to combat the international communist threat and to develop these 
countries as formidable allies, allies that resembled the ideals of modernity and 
progress represented by the US.  Since these countries and their peoples were 
incapable of providing the necessary defense against international communism and to 
refute its appeal, the US felt it must implement policies to ‘guide’ these countries 
along the right path. 
 The appeal of development policies toward Latin America rested firmly on the 
notions of paternalism held by US policymakers.  Development would serve as a 
solution for many within the Eisenhower Administration due to a belief that Latin
Americans had failed to follow the correct path of progress paved by US citizens.  In 
a conversation between John Foster Dulles and Humphrey, Humphrey explained how 
US policies toward Latin America must encourage “South Americans to handle their 
affairs better.”89 
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Paternalism would even impact officials’ fears that Latin Americans would 
not respond positively to the opportunities offered by the US.  One Eisenhower 
official touched upon how development was “difficult to implement because 
‘development’ requires disciplines not readily acceptable…” by Latin American 
countries.90  Whether hoping for the success of development or assuming the eventual 
failure of the idea, the Eisenhower Administration’s search for a new policy t ward 
Latin America would ultimately rest upon the same paternalistic sentiments 
characterizing previous US administrations’ relationships with Latin America. 
Paternalistic attitudes toward Latin Americans shared by US policymakers 
emerge in the policy ideas offered by Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles.  While Dulles discussed the dangers facing US-Latin American reltions, 
President Eisenhower deliberated over cost-effective solutions such as the exchange 
of “notable Americans [such as] university professors [and] exchange lecturers.” 91  
Upon discussing the ‘notable Americans’ qualified for such an expedition, President 
Eisenhower pondered the utility of sending his brother Dr. Milton Eisenhower to 
Latin America.92  For Foster Dulles, such a selection would serve the Eisenhower 
Administration’s purposes perfectly.  Not only would Dr. Eisenhower serve as a 
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suitable representative of the country, but Foster Dulles “thought that was a very good 
way of doing things – in South America that was the way they should be done…you 
have to pat them a little bit and make them think you are fond of them.”93  As the 
Eisenhower Administration sought to retain the benefits of the inter-American 
system, the explanations and solutions retained the paternalism inherent in that 
relationship and pater-Americanism. 
In his “Report to the President on United States-Latin American Relations,” 
Dr. Eisenhower and his solution to the problems facing Latin America remained 
entrenched pater-American principles of paternalism and US superiority.94  
Throughout the report, he reflects the Eisenhower Administration’s perception of 
Latin America primarily with regard to the benefits of the inter-American system.  
From resources to defense to hemispheric solidarity, Dr. Eisenhower valued Ltin 
America for its holistic benefits.  Of these benefits, Dr. Eisenhower takes great pains 
to emphasize the inter-American system.  After stating that the “inter-Am rican 
system preceded the United Nations,” he explains how Latin America provides 
“influence at the United Nations in support of freedom, peace, international justice, 
and effective processes…in the difficult construction of a better world.”95 
Dr. Eisenhower’s appeal for economic aid to Latin America linked economic 
development to social development, but this economic development depended upon 
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US guidance.  Lehman (1997) succinctly explains the logic of Dr. Eisenhower’s 
ideology, “Without fiscal responsibility consistent with the underlying logic and 
principles that made free market capitalism so efficient and effective an economic 
system, there could be no real or lasting social change.”96  ‘Proper’ economic 
assistance, then, would prepare Latin America to thwart the invasion of international 
communism.  Of course, US officials would serve as the driving force behind this 
battle and guide the Latin American countries toward modernity. 
The desire of Dr. Eisenhower to construct a new policy toward Latin America 
would provide the foundation for US policy toward the region throughout the Cold 
War.  Dr. Eisenhower and US officials envisioned solutions that “could change 
growing hemisphere dissidence into a concentration on ‘development’ that would 
leave no time and less desire for ‘isms.’”97  The process of constructing policies of 
containment supplemented with policies of development, such as the actions of 
Kennedy Administration and its Alliance for Progress, would target not only the 
immediate threat of international communism but celebrate how Latin America would 
ultimately share the progress and modernity enjoyed by the US and oppose any 
challenge to hemispheric solidarity. 
 The Eisenhower Administration’s policy toward Latin America provided 
solutions to push the inter-American system and the corresponding Latin American 
countries (and their holistic benefits) of World War II into the Cold War and the 
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ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.  However, the 
Eisenhower Administration also began to consider responses to any country that did 
not fall within this framework. 
In an NSC meeting on February 19, 1953, Allen Dulles described Latin 
America as facing “economic nationalism, regionalism, neutralism, and increasing 
Communist influence” due in great part to recent economic difficulties.98  As stated 
earlier, such threats were not new in the analyses of US officials.  US foreign pol cy 
toward Latin America was characterized by the absence of attention to Latin America 
as the region faced economic difficulties.  In response to such difficulties facing their 
neighbors to the south, US officials expected Latin American countries to provide a 
good environment for foreign investment and increased trade, especially from the US.  
However, Eisenhower officials considered these sentiments of ‘nationalism, 
regionalism, neutralism, Communism’ as an unwelcome challenge in the early 1950s.  
John Foster Dulles had testified that, “We used to be able to let South America go 
through the wringer of bad times, and then when times would get better it was right 
there where it was; but the trouble is that now, when you put it through the wringer, it 
comes out red.”99   
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For Dulles, the outgrowths of these sentiments were not only a threat to an 
invaluable source of raw materials and international cooperation.100  Due to the 
appeal of the rapid industrialization and modernization of the Soviet Union, many 
people in Latin America envisioned the Soviet Union as representing a legitimate 
path in the pursuit of modernity and progress.  Some Latin Americans believed that 
following the model of the Soviet Union could provide modernity for Latin 
America.101  From the US perspective, the acceptance of communism as a viable 
alternative to the goals and the ideology of the US would not be tolerated.  As Dulles 
emphasized, one of the greatest challenges to US foreign policy in the Cold War and 
toward Latin America would be to convince Latin Americans that communism was 
“an international conspiracy…” which undermined democracy and freedom.102 
 US officials ultimately expected the countries of Latin America to conform to 
pater-Americanism.  Latin America must join the US in its efforts to combat the 
invasion of international communism.  Each country must provide the US and the 
inter-American system with resources and solidarity, culminating in a hemispheric 
haven for democracy and capitalism and an inter-American system against extra-
hemispheric challenges.  Therefore, no Latin American country could provide 
sanctuary or support to international communism and its supporters. 
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 The benefits of the inter-American system hinged upon the continued unity of 
Latin America and the United States.  As US officials sought to reinvigorate the inter-
American system, the Eisenhower Administration also considered responses to 
countries that did not conform to US expectations.  As the Eisenhower 
Administration defined in the early policy statement NSC 144/1 “United States 
Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America” in March 1953, 
Latin America’s continued value to the US required hemispheric solidarity.103  
Although the Eisenhower Administration would promise the continued adherence of 
the US to policies of nonintervention with respect to Latin America, these officials 
were limited in their tolerance of any country that deviated from its role.  Gl ijeses 
emphasizes how NSC 144/1 includes (at least, in papers not shared in the initial 
public documents) a rather important sentence.  Should the inter-American system 
“fail to protect vital United States national interests in this hemisphere, it is 
recognized that unilateral action by the United States may be necessary.”104 
 The inter-American system for Eisenhower officials provided essential 
resources and hemispheric solidarity, yet such value depended upon the conformity of 
Latin American countries to the goals of US officials, to the ideology of US foreign 
policy toward Latin America.  For a victory in the Cold War, the US required its 
allies to eliminate any communist influences, whether those influences wer policies, 
organizations, or people.  Within NSC 144/1, the willingness of the Eisenhower 
Administration to provide resources, aid, and support to Latin American countries 
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and the inter-American system hinged upon such compliance.  If a Latin American 
country were to follow the example of the US, the country served as a component of 
the inter-American system and fell within the framework of pater-Americanism.  If a 
Latin American country were to contest the hegemony of the US and its ideology, the 
Eisenhower Administration would not recognize such a country as a legitimate ally or 
component within the inter-American system.  Eisenhower and many of his officials 
prepared to face both situations and ensure that the inter-American system would 
remain intact as a manifestation of pater-Americanism. 
It is within the first years of the Eisenhower Administration’s foreign policy 
toward Latin America that the examples of Guatemala and Bolivia occur.  In 1953 
and 1954, Eisenhower officials turned their attention to these two nationalist, 
reformist governments.  The responses of the Eisenhower Administration to these two 
governments would draw upon the foreign policy described above. 
47 
Chapter 4 
First Fears: US-Guatemalan Relations, 1944-1951 
 The collision between the Eisenhower Administration and the Guatemalan 
revolutionary government under President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán had its roots in the 
first steps of the Guatemalan Revolution in 1944.  With the overthrow of the 
traditional parties, Guatemalans embarked upon a truly revolutionary experience.  
These first interactions influenced the trajectory of US-Guatemalan re tions in 1951 
and US officials’ perceptions of the Latin American country’s leadership. 
For 13 years, Jorge Ubico y Castañeda stood as a ruthless dictator.  Ubico 
emerged in the early 1930s as one of the more ruthless Guatemalan governors capable 
of maintaining the status quo during the economic crash of 1929.  As Guatemala’s 
export industries endured economic hardships, Ubico ensured order.  During his 
dictatorship, Ubico alienated the middle class by slashing the government budge an  
limiting the bureaucracy.  Ubico repressed urban labor, deeming any union supporters 
or labor advocates as communists and subversives.105 
 Ubico’s government drew support from the landowners and the military.  
Ubico formalized the landowners’ dominance over the indigenous population.  The 
indigenous population comprised two-thirds of the 2.25 million population, but 
almost three-fourths of agricultural land belonged solely to less than 2 percent of the 
population.106  Landowners wished to increase labor productivity, yet such 
improvements depended upon bettering the living conditions of the indigenous 
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masses.  These goals were dwarfed by the landed aristocracy’s preoccupati ns with 
increased wages and fears of an indigenous uprising.107 
 For years, in order to ameliorate such fears, landowners banded together, with 
government assistance, to repress indigenous laborers. 108  For decades, landowners 
maintained a universal 15 centavos wage, required every indigenous male between 
the ages of 18 and 60 to work on a landowner’s estate for 100 days, and killed any 
dissidents.  Under Ubico, such operations were not only formalized but reinforced, as 
exemplified by Ubico’s legalization of a landowner’s murder of an indigenous 
worker.  Ubico’s dictatorship may have officially eliminated debt peonage, but new 
mechanisms served to control the indigenous peoples. 
 Ubico utilized the military to solidify his position in the country.  The military 
led forced labor patrols, controlled the schools, and served throughout the 
government bureaucracy.  While many indigenous served as enlisted soldiers, the 
officers emerged from the Ladino class.109  These Ladinos perceived the military as 
an opportunity for upward mobility in times of economic hardships, and this 
reinforced the social stratification defining the country’s demographics.110  With less 
than 800 officers and 6,000 enlisted, the Guatemalan army worked alongside the 
Guatemalan police to provide Ubico and the landowners throughout the country with 
a sense of tranquility for over a decade.111 
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 Similar to many Latin American leaders and dictators during this period, 
Ubico’s style integrated numerous aspects of European fascism.  Fearful of 
communist subversion and indigenous uprisings, Ubico utilized the military and the 
bureaucracy to expand the government’s reach throughout the country.  Ubico’s 
government acquired significant legitimacy among the Guatemalan elites when his 
government uncovered a communist conspiracy in 1934.  During the 1930s, US 
newspapers frequently linked the Ubico dictatorship to the Axis countries of 
Germany, Italy, and Japan.112 
 At the onset of World War II, Ubico presented his dictatorship as a model 
Latin American ‘banana republic’ government for the US in order to combat any 
fascist labels and obtain US economic assistance.  Ubico promised the United States 
any and all available resources for the Allies’ war efforts and present d Guatemala as 
an invaluable cog in the inter-American system.  The US military received land and 
personnel to create military bases.113  Guatemala declared war on Japan, Italy, and 
Germany without hesitation, contributing to the image of hemispheric solidarity 
behind the US.  In compliance with the FBI, Ubico discriminated against 
Guatemalans of German origin and expropriated coffee estates belonging to the 
German community.114  For the FDR administration, a Guatemala under Ubico’s 
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hand conformed, if not exemplified, the role of a Latin American government in the 
inter-American system. 
 The summer of 1944, though, signaled a change throughout Guatemala.  In El 
Salvador, the military dictator Maximiliano Hernández Martínez fell.  Such an 
episode increased fears among other dictators, and Ubico responded by strengthening 
his regime’s hand throughout Guatemala.  In response, teachers and students 
protested the government’s authoritative rule.  The groups supporting the protest 
gradually grew to include other professionals, the middle class, and the impoverished.  
Ubico’s military and police responded to this ‘state of siege’ with violence against 
life and property of those participating in anti-Ubico protests.  As the protest 
incorporated new dissidents, Ubico would resign, leaving a military junta in his 
place.115 
 Despite the value of the Ubico dictatorship to the inter-American system, th  
US government played a rather insignificant role during the Guatemalan Revolution.  
The actions of the revolutionary movement evoked sympathy from US officials.  As 
Guatemalans sought to remove Ubico, they invoked the rhetoric of the Allies and the 
principles of World War II.  FDR’s ‘Four Freedoms’ inspired Guatemalans to 
struggle for the freedoms of speech, of religion, from want, and from fear.116  
Guatemalans incorporated the Atlantic Charter into their statements of their ideals 
and celebrated democracy’s crusade against fascist totalitarianism.117  As a result, US 
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officials initially saw little difference between Ubico’s Guatemala nd the 
revolutionary Guatemala of 1944.118  Both the revolutionary movement and its 
military junta expressed to US officials a similar position in the internaio l war, and 
such sentiments appealed to some US officials with the promise of a democratic 
Guatemala committed to both the Allies’ efforts and the inter-American system. 
 Nevertheless, the early US government response to the Guatemalan 
Revolution was ambivalent.  When the US ambassador in Guatemala expressed his 
fear of the Revolution, Norman Armour of the State Department succinctly expressed 
the US position, “We wish to cultivate friendly relations with every government in 
the world and do not feel ourselves entitled to dictate to any country what form of 
government best suits its national aspirations.  We nevertheless must naturally feel a 
greater affinity, a deeper sympathy and a warmer friendship for governments which 
effectively represent the practical application of democratic processes.”119  US 
officials identified the revolutionary movement with Allied sympathies, yet th se 
officials did not provide any direct support to the revolutionaries.  While the Mexican 
government expressed its sympathy with the revolutionaries, the US government 
appeared to vacillate on a proper response.  One US official noted that Ubico “has 
completely dominated the country but in fairness it must be said that Guatemala has 
no real tradition of liberty and that in return for the suppression of freedom, he has 
given the country a peaceful, progressive and in general honest administration.”120  
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Despite some US officials’ empathy with the ideals of the revolutionary movement, 
they reserved their final decisions.  These policymakers felt anxious in establishing 
relations with a Latin American country lacking a suitable authority capable of 
guiding it upon the proper path of governance; US officials feared that the country 
would collapse under despotism and violence. 
 The first president to emerge from the triumph of the Guatemala Revolution 
was Juan José Arévalo.  The revolutionary movement and the junta had ousted the 
provisional president General Federico Ponce Vaides because he wished to follow in 
the footsteps of Ubico.  In contrast to their earlier actions, US officials played more of 
a role here by allowing revolutionary leaders to negotiate a settlement with Ponce at 
the embassy.  Throughout these proceedings, US officials recognized the 
revolutionary movement and its ‘responsible’ actions: 
The movement which overthrew Ponce was well planned and efficiently executed as has been 
the effort to restore public order and confidence.  The behavior of the junta and its volunteer 
police has been correct in regard to citizens’ private property.121 
Such rhetoric advocated the revolutionary movement’s leadership under Captain 
Arbenz, Senator Jorge Toriello, and Major Francisco Arana.  Under the junta’s 
direction and with the support of newly established political parties, Arévalo would 
assume the presidency in 1945.122 
 Arévalo’s service to the Guatemalan country is noted for opening civil society 
to political parties, trade unions, and labor reform.  However, labor reforms under 
Arévalo had little effect on the agrarian sector, composed of over three-fourths f the 
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labor force, and the rural populace, comprised of fourth-fifths of the total 
population.123  The Labor Code in 1947 demonstrated the country’s conflicted 
progress. The code granted peasants the right to unionize, yet a union required fifty 
members with two-thirds of the membership deemed literate.124  The labor code, 
therefore, provisioned stiff limitations upon agricultural unions.  Ultimately, 
individual urban unions capitalized upon the new code while agricultural unions 
benefitted little.125 
Another example of the limited reforms existing under the Arévalo 
government emerges in evaluating the efforts of the Confederación de Trabajadores 
de Guatemala (CTG).  Despite the union’s communist influences, the CTG frequently 
banded with other labor unions in order to achieve significant victories for the labor 
movement.  The CTG capitalized upon the Labor Code and aided in the 
implementation of the reforms in the urban sector.  Such efforts ensured the CTG 
with a reputation of honest service to labor.  In the countryside, however, the CTG 
faced repression and violence from landowners, formal barricades from the law, and 
limited resources.  Without significant investments to the countryside’s infrastructure 
or governmental assistance under Arévalo, peasants’ livelihoods differed little from 
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previous dictatorships.  Arévalo appeared hesitant to commit to any significant labor 
reform in the countryside.126 
Furthermore, the Arévalo government did not attempt any holistic program of 
agrarian reform.  In the government’s administration of almost 130 estates called the 
Fincas Nacionales,127 these lands remained relatively unproductive.  Any reform 
effort implemented under the Arévalo government was generally hindered by 
bureaucratic incompetence and corruption.  This resulted from the incompetence and 
corruption of the bureaucracy as well as the government’s inability to properly 
develop the estates or invest in their future.128 
Throughout the Truman Administration, US officials wavered in their 
analyses of the Arévalo government and its communist ‘infiltration.’  Further 
discussions and analyses by US officials elaborate upon the Truman Administration’s 
attempts to reconcile Arévalo’s policies with US foreign policy during the Cold War. 
Many US officials linked Arévalo’s reforms, both the successful and the 
poorly implemented, to opportunities for communist infiltration.  In October 1947, 
the US embassy in Guatemala produced a report, “Communism in Guatemala,” which 
linked developments in Guatemala with the infiltration of Communist elements.  This 
characterization of the Guatemalan government would find a sympathetic ear among
some Truman officials (and especially later Eisenhower officials), “Communist 
penetration made startling progress during the immediate post-revolutionary period 
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(1944-47), as evidenced by the radical nature of social, labor and economic reforms, 
accompanied by strong overtones of class warfare.  Infiltration of indoctrinated 
communists, fellow-travelers, and Marxist ideas unquestionably reached dangerous 
proportions.”129  Despite Arévalo’s inability to construct reforms that would impact 
the majority of the population outside the cities, US officials felt that many of the 
successfully implemented reforms would advance communism.  One report claimed 
that “a suspiciously large portion of the reforms advanced by the present 
revolutionary Government seem motivated in part by a calculated effort to further 
class warfare.”130  Another report criticized the literacy program, “at the same time 
these backward Indians get their A.B.C.’s, they get a shot of communism.”131  
Although this analysis conflicts with Gleijeses’ assessment of Arévalo’s limited 
influence in the countryside and among the indigenous populace, US officials 
ascertained that reforms among this ‘susceptible’ population would create inroads for 
communist dominance. 
Arévalo did not remain unmoved by US officials’ preoccupations.  Arévalo 
argued that the reforms of his government should actually ameliorate the fears of US 
officials.  During a conversation between Arévalo and Ambassador Richard C. 
Patterson, Jr., in 1949, Arévalo explained that “the difficulties and apparent 
harassments due [to the] fundamental nature [of the] Guatemalan revolution [were] 
resulting inevitably [in a] conflict between capital and labor effects…felt by 
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Guatemalan capital as well as US private interests.  [The policy of] his government 
[was] precisely one [with] social and economic betterment as [the] only long range 
means [to] remove maladjustments that now unfortunately provide fertile soil [for] 
Communist propaganda.”132  Patterson’s impression fell in line with the assessments 
of Truman officials and especially Eisenhower officials who claimed that the 
reformist governments of Arévalo and Arbenz would be corrupted, infiltrated, and 
subverted by Communists.  However, Arévalo assured US officials that Communism 
would never find a home among the Guatemalan population and that Guatemala 
would inevitably fall into the US sphere of influence.133  Noting how Arévalo’s 
government limited the power of the Communist party and deported many 
communists and labor activists, the State Department characterized Arévalo as a 
voice which might “take steps to end Guatemala’s procrastination on the Communist 
question.”134  Since Arévalo recognized how reform could provide inroads for 
communist influence, Truman officials appreciated the Guatemalan president’ 
vigilance on the issue. 
Truman officials’ reluctance to intervene directly in the Arévalo government 
also derived from the Truman Administration’s unwillingness to abandon the ideals 
of the Good Neighbor Policy and the Atlantic Charter, policies which had linked the 
inter-American system during periods of external threats and influenced some 
revolutionary movements to remain within the US sphere of influence.  US officials 
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even argued intervention would be a contributing factor in pushing Guatemala outside 
of the US sphere of influence.  State department officials explained, “Arévalo was 
popularly elected, appears to enjoy the support of the Guatemalan people, and on the 
whole is democratic in spirit and action.  Accordingly, the United States would regret 
the overthrow of the Arévalo Government by unconstitutional means and the danger 
such overthrow would involve of retrogression in the advance toward full democracy 
of the Guatemalan people.”135  Assessing the Arévalo government, US policymakers 
feared that direct intervention would undermine the US position throughout Latin 
America.   
When United Fruit and International Railways of Central America first 
protested against the Arévalo reforms, the Truman administration did not intervene 
directly on behalf of UFCO and IRCA.  Instead, these officials approached the 
situation with great caution and stressed the need for UFCO and IRCA to take a mor
moderate approach to the reforms.  The State Department should impress “upon the 
Guatemalan Government, and labor unions through such contact as is possible, and 
U.S. firms, the desirability of approaching labor problems fairly and impartially, and 
in accordance with law.  Magnifying the issues into questions of sovereignty and 
removing them from their true significance as management-employee problems, can 
only be detrimental to both sides…As a basis for continuation of this missionary 
work, we have two glaring examples (the United Fruit Company, and IRCA cases) of 
how improper handling and magnification of labor issues has done nothing but force 
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dubious face-saving settlements after provoking a vast amount of lasting ill will.” 136  
While observing the importance of private enterprise, Truman officials did not 
believe that the US government should only invest in those countries that serve North 
American private enterprise unquestionably.  Under-secretary James E. Webb pithily 
explained the Truman Administration’s policy to a Guatemalan official, saying, “the 
State Department…is not the blind advocate of American enterprise abroad.”137 
The growing uncertainty surrounding the US officials’ understanding of the 
Arévalo government becomes more apparent after 1947.  Here, the Truman 
Administration’s analysis of the Arévalo government recognized its democratic ideals 
while showing a preoccupation of the country’s future under a nationalist 
government.  For example, as the reforms of the Arévalo government took effect, the 
State Department utilized Ambassador Patterson to pressure the government to 
conform to US officials’ expectations.  At the same time, the State Department 
refused to openly label the Arévalo government as Communist or challenge the 
government, “[Patterson] should carefully refrain in any way from conveying the 
impression that this Government is assuming, or intends to assume, a threatening 
posture toward Guatemala, which is not the case.  However, the Department feels, 
and you may so state to the President, that it cannot continue to conduct its relations 
with the Guatemalan Government in that cordial and cooperative spirit that has 
inspired it in the past unless there is a reciprocal desire on the part of the Guatemalan 
Government to contribute likewise to mutual understanding, fair treatment, and 
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friendly cooperation.”138  Here, it is clear that Guatemala’s departure from its 
prescribed role in the inter-American system began to worry Truman officials.  These 
officials did not wish to undermine the democratic developments that found 
inspiration by linking with the ‘democracies,’ the Allies.  On the other hand, Truman 
officials began to fear losing Guatemala, as a source of support and resources, within 
the context of the inter-American system. 
The years of 1949 and 1950 signaled to many US officials the challenge that 
an uncontained nationalist, reformist government in Latin America posed to the inter-
American system and the Cold War.  The assassination of Colonel Francisco Javier 
Arana in 1949 produced the election of Arbenz in 1950 and caused great unease in 
the US.  Wood invokes the analysis of C.C.H. Lee, a British ambassador to Latin 
America with strong links to US policymakers, to describe how many US officials 
characterized the assassination.  For Lee, the assassination allowed for Arévalo “to 
achieve his object of subjecting Guatemala to Moscow’s plans,” for Arana 
represented the “sole moderating influence on the more extreme members of this 
government.”  Guatemala stood “on the point of becoming the first ‘iron-curtain’ 
state in this continent,’ and, ‘unless the United States government [adopts] a very 
strong attitude towards the leaders of the Guatemalan State, we shall be confronted 
with a Kremlin-controlled focus in Central American of incalculable potential danger.  
The unblushing hypocrisy and the dastardly treachery of the present top men of 
Guatemala in this murder of Arana warrant the development of our future policy 
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towards them upon a premise that their avowed object is to make Guatemala one of 
Moscow’s satellites.”139 
Applying Pastor’s analysis of how US officials seek the more moderate 
representative during Latin American political successions, the eliminat on of Arana 
(and the inability of the Guatemalan government to determine the culprits) se ved to 
influence members of the Truman and the upcoming Eisenhower Administration.  As 
Arbenz took office in 1951, the US had no ambassador to Guatemala, sold no arms to 
the country, and began to listen to more voices championing UFCO and the 
unquestioning protection of private enterprise in the banana republic.  Such 
sentiments reflect the shift in the attitudes of US officials toward the departing 
Arévalo government, increasing fears of Communist infiltration in a Latin American 
country susceptible to external influence. 
A shift became more apparent when the Truman Administration departed.  
Before a House committee, Adolf Berle foreshadowed what would become a central
argument of not only the Eisenhower Administration’s policy toward Latin America 
but future administrations’ policies.  Berle claimed that “Guatemala presents a 
genuine penetration of Central America by Kremlin Communism.”  Berle then 
described possible US responses.  Touching upon armed intervention, Berle fell in 
line with past policy and reservations against intervention in claiming that any such 
action would be “an extremely bad last resort.” The better option, according to Berle, 
would be “organizing a counter-movement, capable of using force if necessary, based 
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in a cooperative neighboring republic.”140  Berle reflected the preferences of some US 
officials.  Fearful of hemispheric backlash resulting from direct US intervention 
against a radical Latin American government, these officials would consider 
providing support to US allies and rebels.  If a Latin American country would not 
take the ‘proper’ path of governance, US policymakers would seek to identify a 
‘proper’ alternative to the government and provide it with aid to replace the 
government.  With the Truman Administration’s refusal to intervene directly in 
Guatemala or overthrow the Guatemalan government, the incoming Eisenhower 
Administration would have the opportunity to determine the final say on the matter. 
                                                
140 Schoultz, 339. 
62 
Chapter 5 
Challenging the System: US-Guatemalan Relations,1953-1954 
The Eisenhower Administration’s reaction to the Arbenz government in 1953 
and 1954 depended on Eisenhower officials’ interpretation of the role of Guatemala 
in the inter-American system, a core component to the ideology of US foreign policy
toward Latin America that I have defined as pater-Americanism.  Basing it  
perceptions upon earlier analyses of the Guatemalan Revolution and escalating 
challenges to US foreign policy during the Cold War, the Eisenhower Administration 
concluded the Arbenz government was composed of communist agents.  Following 
the works of Blasier (1985), Wood (1985), and Cottam, this thesis argues that the 
Eisenhower Administration’s support of a counter-revolutionary movement to 
overthrow the Arbenz government was in great part a response to the Guatemalan 
government’s departure from its expected role in the inter-American system.  Many 
Eisenhower officials would consistently contend that their operations against Arbenz 
simply overthrew a communist infiltrated government.  Schoultz and numerous other 
scholars, on the other hand, have pointed out that Eisenhower officials had little proof 
in 1954 of communist agents or subversion threatening the well being of the 
country.141  It is for this reason that scholars continue to explore the Eisenhower 
Administration’s reaction to the Arbenz government and assess the factors tha 
contributed to these actions.  This thesis adds to this scholarly discussion by arguing 
that the Eisenhower Administration evaluated the Arbenz government within the 
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framework of pater-Americanism; Eisenhower officials judged that the Arb nz 
government not only diverged from its responsibility as a Latin American 
government but also challenged US expectations that Guatemala should follow this 
role. 
As the Eisenhower Administration implemented its foreign policy toward 
Latin America, US officials continued to view Guatemala as ill-equipped for self-
governance.  Schoultz argues that Eisenhower officials’ analysis of Guatemal  
incorporated the domino theory idea held by many policymakers.  Lacking the 
capability to determine its own path toward proper governance, Guatemala and the 
rest of Latin America must then follow in the US image.  Otherwise, one Latin 
American country that succumbs to communist infiltration would inevitably lead its 
neighbors to follow the same flawed path.142 
The Eisenhower Administration’s initial perceptions of the Arbenz 
government drew from the policies implemented under the Truman Administration.  
As Eisenhower officials sought to realize NSC 141, policymakers took into account 
the absence of a comprehensive mutual defense agreement between the US and 
Guatemala.  Mutual defense agreements had been established between the US and 
various Latin American governments (especially those in the Caribbean).  As 
Eisenhower policymakers prepared to reinforce anti-communist policies throughout 
the hemisphere, these officials continued the Truman Administration’s embargo to 
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prevent Guatemala from acquiring arms.143  Gauging Guatemalan developments 
alongside challenges in Korea and Iran, US officials separated the Arbenz 
government from other, more cooperative Latin American governments. 
When Guatemalans elected Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán as president in 1950, 
Arbenz would quickly challenge the United Fruit Company’s (UFCO) monopolistic 
control over the country’s resources and economy as well as pater-Americanism by 
defying US officials’ regulations concerning private investment.  On June 17, 1952, 
Arbenz initiated the Agrarian Reform Law.  Denied foreign loans and facing US 
pressures, Arbenz believed that Guatemala would have to pursue a program of 
economic development without significant external assistance.  With the approval of 
Decree 900, Arbenz initiated a systematic program of agrarian reform.  The Arbenz 
government utilized Decree 900 to expropriate uncultivated lands and distribute any 
such lands to peasant families.  Under Decree 900, around 1.5 million acres of land 
were expropriated.  Decree 900 was complemented with a public works program.  
The public works program sought to construct a network of roads, a port in Santo 
Tomás, and a hydroelectric plant.  The Arbenz government thus initiated an economic 
program for “self-sustained economic development based on agrarian reform and 
public works.”144  Ultimately, Decree 900 targeted the unequal distribution of land 
that had dominated the Guatemalan country for centuries and portrayed the endeavors 
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of the Arbenz government to embark upon a path of economic development different 
from the approach favored by US officials. 
The Arbenz government’s agrarian reform impacted the land holdings of 
UFCO.  UFCO virulently condemned the agrarian reform as the company watched 
the Arbenz government expropriate uncultivated land throughout the country.  
Owning almost 550,000 acres of land in Guatemala, UFCO officials argued that the 
company needed the land in the event that a banana disease ravaged those lands 
already in cultivation.145  In March 1953, the Arbenz government expropriated 
209,842 acres of uncultivated land from UFCO holdings at the Tiquisate plantation.  
The Arbenz government, though, did engage with UFCO to provide compensation for 
the expropriation.  The Arbenz government offered $627,572 in bonds.  This offer 
was based upon UFCO’s tax documents, but UFCO had consistently devalued their 
lands in order to avoid taxes.  Indignant at the seizure and the devalued compensation 
offer, UFCO officials then appealed to Eisenhower officials, claiming that the Arbenz 
government was unfairly targeting foreign investment.146 
US officials, less than a month after the Arbenz government seized the UFCO 
lands at Tiquisate, lodged a formal protest.  Eisenhower officials filed the protest 
citing the policies for expropriation explained by Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 
1938 in light of the expropriation of US properties in Mexico: 
We cannot admit that a foreign government may take he property of American nations in 
disregard of the rule of compensation under internatio l law.  Nor can we admit that any 
government unilaterally and through its municipal legislation can, as in this instant case, 
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nullify this universally accepted principle of international law, based as it is on reason, equity, 
and justice.147 
Eisenhower officials, fearful of communist seizures of private investments in the 
Third World, believed that international law demanded ‘just’ compensation for 
expropriated lands.  Furthermore, US policymakers interpreted ‘just’ compensation as 
‘prompt, adequate, and effective’ compensation.  In alignment with the idea that 
private property is a natural right, Eisenhower officials expected the Arbnz 
government to conform to such international obligations. 
In response to the first note, the Arbenz government asserted the Guatemalan 
country’s rights to expropriate property and determine the definition of ‘just’ 
compensation.  The Arbenz government’s reply claimed that Decree 900 targeted 
uncultivated lands throughout Guatemala, not just those belonging to UFCO.  
Guatemalan officials reiterated that the seized lands were in “permanent 
unproductiveness.”  The Arbenz government also criticized Eisenhower officials or 
questioning the amount offered in bonds to UFCO.  Guatemalan officials emphasized 
how the value of the bonds was determined by UFCO tax claims, and the Arbenz 
government’s seizure of UFCO lands and offer of $627,572 were ‘just’ actions on the 
part of the national government.148 
The Eisenhower Administration refused to recognize the Arbenz 
government’s right to challenge US officials’ demands.  In August 1953, Eisenhower 
officials sent a second note to the Guatemalan government.  These officials 
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questioned the ‘fair’ application of Decree 900, for almost two-thirds of the total land 
seized belonged originally to UFCO.  Eisenhower officials also criticized the Arbenz 
government’s interpretation of ‘just’ compensation.  US officials stated that the 
Arbenz government had an obligation to conform to international law and provide 
‘prompt, adequate, and effective’ payments to UFCO.  Eisenhower officials then 
disapproved of the bond payments, for bonds payments could “scarcely…be regarded 
as either prompt or effective payment.”149  US officials then told the Arbenz 
government to settle the issue with the company, the US government, or an 
international tribunal.  Guatemalan officials did not agree to any of these terms, and 
Guatemala’s Foreign Minister Guillermo Toriello labeled Eisenhower officials’ 
actions as “another attempt to meddle in the internal affairs of Guatemala.”150 
Eisenhower officials believed that the Arbenz government departed from its 
obligations under international law as well as its role in the inter-American system.  
The economic assistance and mutual security pacts offered to Latin American 
countries depended upon that country’s respect for private property.  When the 
Eisenhower Administration made a formal claim for $15,845,849 against the Arbenz 
government for compensation to UFCO, Eisenhower officials felt the US government 
was justified in setting the Guatemalan government upon the proper path.  The 
Arbenz government not only asserted its rights to expropriate lands but also 
challenged the authority of the US government.  The efforts of the Arbenz 
government to determine its right to self-governance conflicted with long-held 
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perceptions of Latin American’s inferiority.  Eisenhower officials’ perception of the 
Arbenz government emerged from these officials’ adherence to the ideology of pater-
Americanism and the nation’s departure from its role in the inter-American system in 
the face of an extra-hemispheric ideological challenge to the US. 
The impact of such defiance of US officials’ interpretation of the ideological 
orientation of the Arbenz government and its challenge to its set role in the inter-
American system became apparent in the perception of Assistant Secretary of State 
for American Republics (Inter-American) Affairs John Moors Cabot.  Having served 
previous administrations in various capacities, Cabot originally represented a voice in 
opposition to the Eisenhower Administration’s operations against the Arbenz 
government.  Cabot explained, “I had been brought up on the doctrine of non-
intervention and I could recall various episodes in which intervention had ended 
disastrously.”151 
Furthermore, Cabot was responsible for the first US complaint in March 1953 
that encouraged the Arbenz government to rethink its compensation policy.152  When 
former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director General Walter B dell Smith 
became the Undersecretary of State for Foster Dulles, Cabot initially clashed with 
Smith’s policies.  Cabot describes how in 1953 Smith had “suggested a coup against 
the Arbenz government, pointing out that the coup against the Mossadegh 
government in Iran had been staged by the CIA and the British secret service and that 
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our involvement had not become public at the time.”153  In line with most of the staff 
in the department with experience under previous administrations, Cabot instead 
explained how “it would be better to act through the Organization of American States
if that were possible” and discouraged the implementation of a coup against 
Arbenz.154  Schlesinger and Kinzer points out that Cabot’s family owned stock in 
UFCO and had worked for the company as examples of how UFCO utilized its 
connections with US officials to encourage intervention in Guatemala.155  On the 
other hand, Wood’s (1985) description of Cabot portrays an Eisenhower official 
hesitant to intervene directly in the internal affairs of a Latin American country and 
refusing to contradict the principles of the Good Neighbor Policy.156 
Cabot, however, quickly changed both his perception of the Arbenz 
government and his policy recommendations.  In April 1953, Cabot visited 
Guatemala and met with Arbenz and other Guatemalan officials.  During the meeting, 
Cabot reiterated the Eisenhower Administration’s position on ‘just’ compensation and 
encouraged the Arbenz government to play a more active role in suppressing 
Communist organizations in the country.  The Foreign Minister Raúl Osegueda and 
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Arbenz refused to comply with Cabot’s suggestions.157  Upon his return to the US, 
Cabot explained: 
My talks in Guatemala were highly unsatisfactory.  The Foreign Minister [Osegueda] was a 
complete jackass who talked endlessly without making a y sense.  President Arbenz had the 
pale, cold-lipped look of the ideologue and showed no interest in my suggestions for a change 
in his government’s direction.  He had obviously sold out to the Communists and that was 
that.158 
Despite Cabot’s initial reservations about intervening in Guatemala’s internal affairs, 
Cabot’s interpretation of his meetings with Arbenz and other Guatemalan officials in 
1953 led him to return to Smith and argue that “a CIA-organized coup was the only 
solution.”159   
Entrenched in the ideology of the Cold War and the principles of pater-
Americanism, Cabot interpreted the Arbenz government’s refusal to comply with his 
recommendations as hints of communist subversion.  His years of experience deemed 
that only a subverted Latin American country would challenge its role in the inter-
American system.  Blasier (1985) describes how Toriello approached Eisenhower and 
Smith on behalf of the Arbenz government in early 1954 and claimed that Cabot’s 
interests in UFCO were influencing Cabot’s capability as a nonbiased observer.  
Blasier (1985) then writes that Cabot’s stock and connections to UFCO probably had 
a fairly insignificant impact upon Cabot’s assessment of the Arbenz government.160  
This argument stresses that a ‘seasoned’ foreign policy official would have remained 
objective despite such influences.  Such a factor, however, must still be kept in mind, 
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as demonstrated with Schlesinger and Kinzer’s investigation of UFCO connections to 
important Eisenhower officials. 
The analysis of Cabot’s articulation of the Guatemalan situation and his 
shifting perception of Guatemalan officials suggests the actual factors behind Cabot’s 
justification for US intervention in Guatemala.  Cabot’s perception of Arbenz was 
entrenched in pater-Americanism.  Cabot initially adhered to policies of 
nonintervention.  When Arbenz defied Cabot’s call to reorient the Guatemalan 
government within the expectations of US policymakers, Cabot then called for efforts
to undermine the Arbenz government.  The refusal of Arbenz to realize Guatemala’s 
‘responsibilities’ challenged this set ideology and thus directly influenced Eisenhower 
officials’ decision to eliminate the Arbenz government.  Resulting from its refu al to 
comply with US officials’ demands for ‘just’ compensation and communist 
suppression, the Arbenz government crossed the Eisenhower officials’ threshold of 
disobedience and deviated from Guatemala’s expected role in the inter-American 
system. 
The Eisenhower Administration condemned the Arbenz government for its 
toleration of Communists.  As president of Guatemala, Arbenz reversed his 
predecessor’s political censorship of Communist organizations.  Gleijeses, 
Schlesinger and Kinzer, and Blasier (1985) have all acknowledged that Arbenz 
allowed for Communists to play significant roles in the Guatemalan government and 
reformist programs.  Blasier (1985) writes: 
Under Arbenz the Communist influence in governmental aff irs grew.  Although only four of 
the fifty-six members of congress were Communists, Communist deputies had seats on all 
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major committees, were among the acknowledged leaders of the congress, and enjoyed 
enhanced influence on legislative matters in view of their recognized ties with the president.  
Communists held posts in the ministry of education, the national agrarian department, the 
press and propaganda offices, and other government ag cies.  In government agencies for the 
implementation of the agrarian reform communists were, perhaps, the most important single 
political group represented.161 
All three texts emphasize, however, that the “government agencies in which the 
Communists had no influence were far more numerous than those they had 
successfully penetrated.”162 
Set in anti-communist policies, the Eisenhower Administration would not 
tolerate the presence of any Communists within the Guatemalan government nor their 
involvement in agrarian reforms (especially those which targeted US private 
investment).163  When officials such as Cabot encouraged the Arbenz government to 
reevaluate the dangers posed by its toleration of Communist participation in the 
Guatemalan government, Arbenz criticized US policies.  Arbenz frequently cited his 
government’s adherence to the civil rights of all Guatemalans, including those of 
Communists.164  US officials, though, would not allow a Latin American government 
to question the US view of the Cold War, an ideological struggle against subversive 
communist agents which would challenge US hegemony.  Louis Halle and the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Staff epitomized Eisenhower officials’ perceptions of 
the Arbenz government in “Our Guatemalan Policy” in 1954: 
The international Communist movement is certainly not the cause of the social revolution in 
Guatemala, but it has made the same efforts there tat it has made everywhere else to harness 
the revolutionary impulses – nationalism and social reform alike – and exploit them for its 
own purposes…[International communism] has achieved a high degree of covert control over 
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the reformist regime of President Arbenz and is dominant in the national labor 
movement…the real and direct threat that Guatemala poses for her neighbors is that of 
political subversion through the kind of across-the-borders intrigue that is a normal feature of 
the Central American scene.  The danger is of Communist contagion and is most immediate 
with respect to Guatemala’s immediate neighbors.  The Communist infection is not going to 
spread to the U.S. but if it should in the fullness of time spread over much of Latin America it 
would impair the military security of the Hemisphere and thus of the U.S.165 
The Eisenhower Administration could only interpret the Arbenz government’s 
aversion to US officials’ policy suggestions as representative of communist 
infiltration.  Guatemalan officials “showed…no comparable understanding of the 
obligations of neighborliness, no recognition of the fact that, to avoid destruction, 
they must evict Communists from their administration.”166 
 As a result of Guatemalan leadership’s refusal to yield to US officials’ 
demands, the Eisenhower Administration initiated Operation PBSUCCESS.  Colonel 
Carlos Castillo Armas and US-funded troops moved into Guatemala.  US aircraft 
bombed Guatemalan military bases, and CIA operatives bribed and discouraged 
Guatemalan forces from further attacks against the counter-revolutionaries.  On June 
27, 1954, Arbenz left the presidency.  The Eisenhower Administration celebrated 
“Guatemala’s decision” to combat communist forces and congratulated the new 
president of Guatemala, Castillo Armas. 
The Arbenz government’s defiance of the demands of the Eisenhower 
Administration challenged pater-Americanism.  US officials assumed that ‘suitable’ 
Latin American governments would concede to US demands and priorities.  The 
Arbenz government, though, pursued a path of governance that strayed from the path 
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set by US officials and pater-Americanism.  Arbenz insisted upon implementing 
social reform and building a nation independent of external forces.167  Arbenz 
incorporated Guatemalan Communists into his government’s reform programs and 
refused to yield to US officials’ demands.  Arbenz’s leadership placed the 
Guatemalan government upon a course opposing that directed by US officials. 
Eisenhower officials thus interpreted the Arbenz government’s unwillingness 
to conform to US demands concerning compensation and communism as challenges 
to the inter-American system, pater-Americanism, and US dominance.  Schoultz 
describes how John Foster Dulles argued in 1954, “if the United Fruit matter were 
settled, if they gave a gold piece for every banana, the problem would remain just s 
it is today as far as the presence of communist infiltration in Guatemala is concerned.  
That is the problem, not United Fruit.”  Schoultz then comments, “it is possible that 
United Fruit had fooled him and others into believing that Guatemala’s government 
was communist.”  In agreement with Domínguez, Schoultz emphasizes how 
communism impacted US officials’ analysis of Arbenz and his government.168  How 
were Eisenhower officials ‘fooled’ then, and why did this justify the Eisenhower 
Administration’s crusade against the Arbenz government? 
The Eisenhower Administration evaluated the Arbenz government through the 
lens set by pater-Americanism.  As the Arbenz government defied US officials’ 
demands, Eisenhower officials interpreted these actions as hints of communist 
subversion and as challenges to US supremacy in the region.  The Eisenhower 
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Administration’s refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the Arbenz government 
developed from the Arbenz government’s rejection of its role in the inter-American 
system.  Formulating policies set upon US preeminence and Latin America’s 
expected submission to US guardianship over the Western Hemisphere, US officials 
such as Cabot would have few qualms in participating in the overthrow of what they 
perceived to be a misguided Latin American government. 
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Chapter 6 
Learning Lessons: US-Bolivian Relations, 1941-1951 
 The Paz government and the leadership of the Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario (MNR) would serve as a voice of the Bolivian Revolution in the early 
1950s.  The MNR leadership would come to power while utilizing its previous 
experiences with US officials and their adherence to pater-Americanism.  From its 
inception as a political party, the MNR clashed with the US due to its nationalist and 
reformist policies.  The MNR, though, took lessons from these experiences once it 
gained power in 1953. 
 On the eve of the Revolution, Bolivia shared numerous characteristics with 
Guatemala.  The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed the expansion of the 
hacienda system.  Only 6 percent of landowners controlled 92 percent of the 
productive land.  Furthermore, the large indigenous population worked the lands of 
the latifundistas.  With few incentives to bring in the absentee landowners, the 
agricultural sector was marred by a lack of capital investments.  In addition, Bolivia 
was dependent on food imports.  From the 1920s into the early 1950s, foodstuffs 
would account for ten to twenty percent of imports. More than two-thirds of the 
population participated in the agricultural sector, yet agriculture and its related 
industries provided merely a third of the gross national product.169 
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 The tin industry reflected the agricultural sector’s oligarchic structu e and lack 
of capital investment.  By the mid-1940s, the Patiño, Aramayo, and Hochschild 
families (the Big Three) controlled over three-fourths of the tin industry.  Tin 
accounted for 80 percent of the country’s national exports.  The Big Three also 
incorporated their companies overseas, seeking to avoid Bolivian tax laws.  Even 
though tin provided the most revenue to the government, the tin companies 
maneuvered to avoid investing in their companies’ infrastructure in Bolivia.  The Big 
Three sought to evade sharing their profits with the Bolivian government, so the 
decapitalization of their mines served not only to avoid taxes but also to undermine 
the productivity of their mines.170  Bolivia ultimately represented a powerful 
contradiction: a backward country with the majority of the population depending 
upon a single raw mineral to fund imports of necessary foodstuffs, even though this 
population primarily served in the agricultural sector. 
 The origins of the MNR would provide later lessons to the party’s leadership 
due to the impact of the US government on the party’s history.  These origins can be 
traced to the seizure of Standard Oil properties in 1937.171  A nationalist reformist 
military government under the leadership of Colonel David Toro had arisen in 1936 
due to the country’s military loss during the Chaco War (1932-1936) and overthrew 
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the government of Daniel Salamanca.  The Chaco War represented an important point 
in Bolivia’s history.  Disappointed and marginalized portions of the country felt that 
the tin oligarchy and foreign corporations such as Standard Oil had pushed Bolivia 
into the conflict and had not contributed the necessary resources to support the 
Bolivian cause.  The nationalist dissent against the current government and the ti  
oligarchy’s Rosca172 contributed to the ascent of the Toro regime.173  The Toro 
government sought to capitalize on nationalist hostility to foreign interests, pecially 
those of the British and the US.174  Directing this discontent in order to maintain its 
own fragile position, the Toro government seized Standard Oil properties, attempted 
to moderate the Rosca’s influence in the government, and utilized its popular support 
to enact reformist policies.175  The fall of the Toro regime in 1937 merely brought 
about another nationalist reformist military regime under Germán Busch.  The Busch 
regime followed the same trajectory as the Toro regime.176  With the death of Busch 
in 1939 and seizing upon traditional parties’ desire to scale back the Toro and Busch 
reforms, a military junta pushed General Enrique Peñaranda into the presidency.177 
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US policymakers adhered to a policy of nonintervention and did not apply 
direct pressure on the Toro government, yet US officials demanded that the Bolivian 
government reach an agreement concerning ‘just’ compensation to Standard Oil.178  
As previously described, US foreign policy toward Latin America during World War 
II valued Latin America as a source of raw materials and hemispheric solidarity, vital 
tenets of the inter-American system.  Bolivian policy under the Toro and Busch 
regimes had conflicted with these two tenets, according to US officials. 
US officials’ trepidations surrounding the Bolivian government’s relations 
primarily centered upon the source of strategic materials.  US officials feared that the 
Toro government’s nationalization of Standard Oil properties might serve as an 
example for other Latin American countries.  If other reformist-oriented governments 
were to expropriate US oil companies or other industries, the Western Hemisphere 
would lose much of its strategic importance to US policy, thus undermining US war 
efforts.  US officials also contemplated the need for easy access to tin during a war. 
With essential tin deposits deriving from Asia and Bolivia, the loss of access to Asian 
sources during the war would increase the utility of Bolivian tin.  US officials hoped 
to secure its access to Bolivian tin with a working relationship with the Bolivian 
government.179 
US officials also concerned themselves with the links between Bolivia and 
Germany at this period.  From trade to finance to the military, Germany wielded 
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significant influence in the Latin American country.  Bolivia’s nationalist rhetoric did 
not target German nationals or their property.  US officials perceived Bolivia as an 
ally of Germany.180  Such concerns weighed upon US officials as they sought to bring 
Bolivia into the inter-American system and construct a Latin American policy f r 
World War II. 
The US and Peñaranda governments then entertained the possibilities of US 
economic assistance packages to Bolivia.  To obtain resources and hemispheric 
solidarity, US officials frequently maneuvered around any barriers with promises of 
economic assistance to the country.  The FDR Administration had just expanded the 
reach of the Export-Import Bank to include Latin America, and numerous Peñaranda 
officials sought to secure a US development loan for as much as $80 million.  Despite 
some US officials’ desires to provide Bolivia with economic assistance and rebut any 
further diplomatic inroads by German or Argentine officials, US policymakers stood 
adamant on the issue of compensation.  The Peñaranda government recognized the 
tenuous nature of its situation.  If Peñaranda officials enacted a program of 
compensation for Standard Oil, numerous sectors of Bolivia would classify the action 
as relinquishing control of resources to the company and foreign interests.  This 
would undercut the last vestiges of authority stabilizing the Peñaranda government.181 
The MNR best represented this opposition to the Peñaranda government’s 
pursuit of a degree of accommodation with Standard Oil.  The MNR surfaced in the 
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early 1940s in the wake of the widespread disillusionment in Bolivian governance 
during the Chaco War and the resulting formation of political parties in the 1930s and 
early 1940s.  These parties were dispersed along the political spectrum.  The Partido
Obrero Revolucionario (POR) organized with a Trotskyite tendency and openly 
affiliated with the Fourth International.  The Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionaria 
(PIR) organized in 1940 from the Frente de la Izquierda Boliviano (FIB) which had 
championed the only opponent to Peñaranda in 1940.  The PIR “represented the 
strongest and most general expression of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary 
tendency” in Bolivia and portrayed Stalinist tendencies.  The Falange Socialista 
Boliviana (FSB) epitomized the more successful fascist leanings in the country.182 
The MNR emerged as economic nationalist reactionaries agitated against any 
compromises with foreign interests and companies.  For many, the party represented 
the spirit of disenchantment and reform exhibited in the aftermath of the Chaco War.  
The party espoused a Marxist intellectual framework, calling for the consolidati n of 
the Bolivian economy and state.  Its members’ strident nationalism was answered 
with labels of xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and Fascism.  The MNR, though, 
maneuvered pragmatically with efforts to co-opt the nationalist and reformist 
sentiments among the Bolivian populace.183  Víctor Paz Estenssoro, Augusto 
Céspedes, and Carlos Montenegro stood as the most prominent members of the MNR.  
From his participation in the Toro government as Under Secretary of Treasury to his 
service in the Bolivian legislature during the Peñaranda administration, Paz, alongside 
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his fellow Movimentistas, most vocally scorned any efforts by the Bolivian 
government to negotiate with Standard Oil.184 
As the US government, the Peñaranda administration, and the MNR remained 
at a standoff, US officials presented to the Bolivian government a photocopy of a 
letter between the German diplomat Ernst Wendler and the Bolivian military att ché 
Major Elías Belmonte.  The letter impressed upon US and Bolivian officials that 
Germany and Bolivian military officials were conspiring to overthrow the Peñaranda 
administration.  Although US officials could not authenticate the letter, the Peñaranda 
administration swiftly reacted to the letter’s call for a “coup to liberate [Belmonte’s] 
poor country from a weak government of completely capitalist inclinations.”185  The 
‘Nazi Putsch’ in 1941 witnessed not only the expulsion of the German minister but 
the arrests of many in the MNR leadership, including Walter Guevara, Céspedes, an  
Montenegro, which was associated with fascist ideology and opposition to Standard 
Oil compensation.186 
The events of the Belmonte-Wendler letter, the ‘Nazi Putsch,’ and the attacks 
on Pearl Harbor provided a reorientation in the Bolivian climate.  The silencing of the
MNR for its alleged fascist leanings and increasing sympathy for US war efforts 
allowed for the Peñaranda administration to discuss compensation with Standard Oil.  
Ten days after the ‘Nazi Putsch,’ US policymakers presented to Bolivian officials 
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their intentions “to foster continued mutually beneficial economic relations between 
the United States and Bolivia and to develop the national economy and national 
resources of Bolivia.”187  The Bolivian government paid Standard Oil $1.7 million, 
and the US provided $25 million in economic assistance to the country.  This 
economic assistance included funding for the development and construction of roads, 
agricultural extensions, research programs, health centers, campaigns to eradicat  
malaria, yaws, and small pox, and overall public administration and customs 
collections.188  With immunity from real prices in a competitive market due to its war 
efforts, the US government then benefitted from its domination of Bolivian tin 
production as the primary buyer of Bolivian tin and began to fill its strategic tin 
stocks.189 
Nevertheless, the MNR continued to share its disappointment in the “vulgar 
deal” which put Bolivians’ needs behind those of foreign interests.190  The emergence 
of the MNR brought the party and its leadership in direct conflict with US officials 
and pater-Americanism.  This conflict between the MNR’s objectives and US policy
toward Latin America would influence the MNR’s first experiences in Bolivian 
governance. 
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In December 1942, a miners’ strike at Cataví found the Peñaranda 
administration and the tin companies pitted against labor and the MNR.  A labor 
union presented its demands for higher wages as the Patiño company filed increasing 
revenues of 84 percent, inflation rose 30 percent, and the miners’ real wages 
languished with a raise of only 5 percent.  Patiño representatives requested 
government assistance, and the Peñaranda administration sent the military.  Afe  
killing 35 people, the military and the Peñaranda administration faced public 
repercussions.  Capitalizing upon the ‘Massacre of Cataví,’ the PIR increased its 
influence among the labor unions and miners.  The MNR, on the other hand, entered 
into an alliance with young military officers and overthrew the Peñaranda 
administration.191 
The MNR installed Major Gualberto Villarroel as the new president.  
Emulating their adherence to nationalist reformist policies, the Villarroel egime 
reignited many of the policies initiated under the Toro and Busch regimes.  Military 
officers as well as the Movimentistas Paz, Céspedes, Guevara, and Montenegro l d 
these efforts.  For US officials, though, these Movimentistas and their military allies 
signified the infiltration of fascism into the Western Hemisphere.192 
US-Bolivian relations returned to their pre-Peñaranda status.  After generating 
strong relations with the Peñaranda administration, US policymakers viewed the 
Villarroel regime as “an embarrassing dilemma” and decided to withhold recognition 
until they could complete a more thorough analysis of the new Bolivian 
                                                
191 Malloy, 119-20; Dunkerley, 14-6. 
192 Pike (1977), 259. 
85 
government.193  US officials continued to view the MNR as a party under a fascist 
ideology.  Secretary Cordell Hull best epitomized US officials’ preoccupations 
surrounding the Villarroel regime.  Hull considered the MNR government as a threat 
to Allied war efforts and the inter-American system.  Two days after the MNR seized 
power, Hull explained to the US Ambassador in Bolivia that US policymakers needed 
to determine “whether outside influence unfriendly to the Allied cause played an 
part” in the coup.  After all, the provision of recognition to such a regime needed to 
first take into account how “the Hemisphere is at present under sinister and 
subversive attack by the Axis, assisted by some elements within the hemisp re 
itself.”194 
US officials’ deliberations surrounding the recognition of the Villarroel 
regime faced another challenge when Argentina recognized the Villarroel 
government.  The Argentine government shared many characteristics with fascist 
governments.  Hesitant to cast its lot with the Allied war effort, Argentina 
sympathized with the nationalist, reformist military regime of Villarroel and the 
MNR, a composition reflective of the current Argentine leadership.  Throughout 
World War II, Argentine officials sought to foster an interconnected and independent 
structure of Latin American countries apart from that led by the US.195  In response to 
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Argentine recognition and fearful of contributing to the spread of ‘fascist’ influences, 
the US continued to delay its recognition of the Villarroel government.196 
US policymakers constructed their criticism of the Villarroel regime within 
the framework of pater-Americanism and the structure of the inter-American system.  
Early in 1944, US officials circulated a confidential memorandum to all Latin 
American countries, excluding Argentina.  In the memorandum, US officials’ 
opinions of MNR leadership in the Bolivian government and the role of Paz derive 
from the ‘Nazi Putsch’ and MNR opposition to previous US actions: 
  1.  The Bolivian revolutionary regime is made up of two groups: members of the MNR, a 
pro-fascist political party, and young army officers…under Nazi influence as followers or 
associates of the notorious Major Elías Belmonte. 
2.  The recently-published official program and platform of the MNR [are]…hostile to 
continental interests…disparage democracy, are anti-Semitic, glorify the leadership principle 
and an all-powerful state and disregard the threat to hemisphere security from Nazi Germany. 
3.  The MNR leaders have been connected with Nazi groups in Germany and Argentina.  Paz 
Estenssoro…frequented the German Embassy in La Paz and received money from Nazi 
agents for carrying pro-German propaganda together with party associates… 
4.  [Paz] was involved in 1941 in Nazi-inspired subversive activities of Major Belmonte.  In 
1942 Paz Estenssoro formed connections with Dionisi Fo anini, associate of Belmonte who 
was engaged in a plot with the help of the German Ambassador in Buenos Aires against the 
Peñaranda government.  The official newspaper of the MNR – La Calle received German 
subsidies and its articles expressed an attitude off hostility to the democracy.  MNR 
congressional deputies opposed adherence of Bolivia to the Declaration by United Nations 
and filibustered to impede legislation to speed the war effort…[Paz] associated with 
Argentine pro-Nazis such as Pertiné, Mayor of Buenos Aires, Ibarguren, publicist and writer, 
and others… 
5.  Members of the Junta received financial support fr m pro-Nazi sources.  [Paz] received 
money from Admiral Scasso, and…made arrangements for arms and additional financial 
assistance…Three million bolivianos were secured from German and Argentine sources for 
the revolt.197 
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US officials ascertained that the mission statement, the programs, and the ideological 
orientation of the MNR and the Villarroel administration threatened recent US efforts 
to construct the inter-American system.  Due in great part to the MNR’s nationalist 
rhetoric and position against Standard Oil compensation, US officials continued to 
perceive MNR elements as an ideological challenge to Allied efforts and the inter-
American system. 
 Consequently, US officials utilized recognition, economic assistance, and the 
inter-American system to bring pressure upon the Villarroel government.  US 
officials worked with other Latin American countries (again, excluding Arentina) by 
building upon previous communications and successfully encouraging these countries 
to refuse recognition to the Villarroel government.198  Without recognition, Bolivian 
officials lacked the primary buyer of Bolivian tin (the central source of government 
revenue), significant lend-lease aid, and essential political support in the West rn 
Hemisphere.199 
The Villarroel regime played an active role throughout US officials’ 
deliberations.  As Blasier (1972) pithily writes, “Within hours of its assumption of 
control, the Villarroel government sought to reassure Washington about its desire to 
have good relations with the United States and to support the United Nations in the 
war against the Axis.”200  The Bolivian government engaged in numerous activities to 
convince US officials of its support of the Allied war effort.  Bolivian officials 
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nationalized companies belonging to German and Japanese citizens and froze any 
such funds.  The Villarroel regime even adhered to its contract for the exclusive sale 
of quinine to the US.201 
Nevertheless, the official position of the US did not waver.  US officials 
argued that the blame for the downfall of the Peñaranda administration, an important 
cog within the inter-American system, rested upon “forces outside of Bolivia and 
unfriendly to the defense of the American republics,” forces which “inspired and 
aided” the ascent of the Villarroel regime.202  A US official ‘enlightened’ a Bolivian 
official that the orientation and composition of the Villarroel regime prevented 
Bolivia from a return to US “good graces” and “that there would be no further 
lendlease shipments as long as there was an unrecognized government.”203  This US 
official stressed how the US interpreted that “the revolutionary junta [of Villarroel] as 
it now stood contained elements which were wholly unacceptable and whose Axis 
taint was such that their continued presence precluded recognition by [the US].”204 
The Villarroel government understood the message; the regime removed three 
cabinet members, including Céspedes and Montenegro.  When US policymakers 
claimed that “these shifts have [not] materially altered the character of the [Villarroel] 
junta,” the last three MNR members in the Villarroel administration left.  Among 
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these officials were Paz and Guevara.205  US officials now interpreted the ‘new’ 
Villarroel government as predisposed to the Allied cause.  The US and the Latin 
American countries recognized the Bolivian government in June 1944.  US officials 
then resumed lend-lease aid, economic assistance, and the purchase of Bolivian tin.  
These actions contributed to the end of six months of instability endured by the 
Villarroel government.  US officials thus reinvited Bolivia into the inter-American 
system, for the Bolivian government no longer presented any ideological challenge to 
pater-Americanism. 
These Movimentistas, though, deserve far more respect than that generated 
from a superficial impression of a handful of reform-minded officials ‘pushed’ out by 
US demands.  Various authors have highlighted how the MNR officials’ exits served 
as attempts to maneuver around US policy and aid the Villarroel government.  In July 
1944, less than a month after Bolivia’s securing US recognition and the resumption of 
tin sales, the MNR swept Bolivian elections.  In January 1945, the Villarroel regime 
welcomed Paz and other Movimentistas back into the administration.  Pike (1977) 
describes how, “in 1945, Paz Estenssoro, serving as minister of the treasury, was the
most important political figure next to the president himself.”206  The MNR 
leadership realized the importance of US recognition and Bolivian conformity to US
policy.  As critics of the underdeveloped economic character of the country and its 
dependence upon tin exports and foodstuff imports, Paz and his fellow Movimentistas 
recognized the precarious nature of their membership in a military junta without 
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constitutional or democratic legitimacy.  The MNR accordingly complied with US 
policymakers and granted the Villarroel government a much needed respite from 
these officials’ pressures.  The MNR understood the ideological limits of US 
officials’ tolerance of Latin America’s self-determination.  Paz and the 
Movimentistas understood the inter-American system and the consequences to Latin
American countries that diverged from the ideals held by their northern neighbor. 
In 1945 and 1946, US officials would once again put pressure on the 
Villarroel administration, albeit somewhat indirectly.  The end of the war made tin 
from British Malaya available, and US policymakers utilized their strategic stockpiles 
of tin (accumulated from Bolivian purchases) to drive the international price down.  
As the US-Bolivian tin contract expired in June 1945, Villarroel officials pushed for 
favorable contracts that would provide long-term stability and development 
opportunities in the country.  Víctor Andrade, the Bolivian ambassador to the US, 
explained the crusade and US officials’ backlash to such aid in his memoirs.  As the 
Big Three and Andrade met to negotiate a new contract, the US official seemed to 
forget Bolivian cooperation during the war and the country’s dependence upon tin 
exports.  The official declared that he had anticipated Bolivian discontent with the 
proposed contract, “If one of you wishes to dispute these decisions, I have arranged 
for three chairs to be placed out there under a tree.  I can assure you, however, that I 
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will not occupy one of those chairs.”  Bolivia would only obtain a more favorable 
one-year contract due in great part to Andrade’s appeals to higher US officials.207 
By June 1946, US policymakers allowed for the tin contract with Bolivia to 
once again expire.  Contract renewal faced challenges in the form of the Big Three’s 
opposition, Bolivian tax issues, and US officials’ indecisiveness.  From June into 
July, members of Bolivia’s traditional parties organized against the Villarroel 
government.  As Andrade again pleaded with upper-level US officials to propose a 
new tin contract or free Bolivia from its exclusive contract to sell tin to the US, the 
officials hesitated.208  In Bolivia, the opposition to the Villarroel government 
capitalized on the expiration of the contract and the MNR leadership’s inability to 
secure a second agreement.  US officials never attempted to hide their discontent with 
the ideological orientation and the tainted ‘elements’ of the Villarroel government.  
As Pike writes, “the commodity purchase agreement had lapsed and apparently could 
be advantageously renegotiated only by an administration more to Washington’s 
liking.  This belief, at least, helped provide the catalyst that united the various 
elements of opposition to Villarroel.”209  A revolt removed the Villarroel regime (and 
hung Villarroel) on July 21, 1946. 
US officials, although not seeking to directly cause the overthrow of the 
Villarroel regime, quickly supported the new Bolivian government.  US policymakers 
cast the latest events as contributions to the unified inter-American system and 
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detrimental to the fascist influence of Argentina.  The US Ambassador to Bolivia 
Joseph Flack explained that the elimination of the Villarroel government strengthened 
US influence in Bolivia: 
  A popular revolution in every sense of the word has just occurred in Bolivia…this may 
prove [to be the] first democratic government in Bolivian history.  Immediate prospects are 
greatly improved [Bolivian] relations with the United States… 
  Because of [the] lengths…Argentines went to uphold [the] cruel and Fascist Villarroel 
dictatorship, reprisals in [the] form {of} [the] failure {to} ship needed food may be 
anticipated.  This revolution [is] an irreparable bow {to} [the] formation of [an] anti-United 
States bloc so dear [to] Perón’s heart.  I therefore urge that we be prepared {to} ship any food 
necessary on any terms to prevent this democratic move ent [from] falling victim to Fascist 
reaction because of people’s hunger.  Also that tin negotiations [must] be brought to prompt 
satisfactory conclusion as soon as recognition is accorded.210 
US officials comprehended the value of imported foodstuffs and exported tin to 
Bolivia and the new, fragile government.  The US recognized the new government on 
August 12 and concluded a tin contract on August 14.211 
With the threat of international fascism, an extra-hemispheric challenge to its 
growing ideological dominance, the US government utilized oil, tin, the promise of 
recognition, and economic assistance to assert its supremacy in Bolivia.  In Bolivia, 
coalitions of political parties attempted to enter into the government, replace the 
ruling regimes, assert their country’s rights, and enact revolutionary reforms.  
However, these coalitions faced off against not only internal challenges but the 
external pressure deriving from the country’s dependency upon US tin sales and 
financial aid.  Both the Peñaranda and Villarroel administrations tempered their 
nationalist rhetoric and included US demands in their considerations.  The provisions 
of economic assistance and tin contracts provided the necessary support to solidify 
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(albeit in a temporary way) the administration’s rule.  By maneuvering aound US 
officials’ preoccupations, the Villarroel administration and the MNR leadership 
recognized the dangers of US nonrecognition and maneuvered within US officials’ 
perception of Latin American governance and the inter-American system, 
ameliorating any external pressure emanating from US influence and ideological 
hegemony. 
From 1946 to 1952, the sexenio of interchanging governments provided the 
leadership of the MNR with the opportunity to develop its party.  The Movimentistas 
expanded their influence.  From exploiting social discontent to constructing links with 
labor movements, the MNR grew from a ‘political party to a revolutionary 
movement.’212  MNR officials such as Paz and Andrade had entered and exited the 
political scene due in great part to the perceptions of US officials, the construction of 
US policy, and the pater-American ideals underpinning the inter-American system.  
Such experiences would serve as important lessons as the MNR entered into the 1951 
Bolivian elections. 
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Chapter 7 
Educated Experience: US-Bolivian Relations, 1953-1954 
 After seizing power in 1952, the Paz government and its MNR leadership 
proactively sought to placate US officials.  Applying its previous experiences with 
US-Bolivian relations and the importance of conformity to the inter-American 
system, the Bolivian government would seek out US recognition and assistance in 
order to solidify its position and enact its promises for national reforms.  With a 
treasury of less than 30 million dollars and bearing the repercussions of cancelled tin 
purchases by US officials, the MNR leadership maneuvered within US foreign policy
and fulfilled the pater-American expectations of US policymakers.  The Paz 
government understood the dangers posed by external US pressure upon a fragile 
Bolivian government and the country’s dependency upon tin exports to the US.  The 
MNR leadership was determined not to repeat the same mistakes.213  A  a result of 
the Paz government’s compliance, Eisenhower officials would provide the resources 
necessary to prop up the Paz government and the MNR Revolution. 
 At first glance, the Eisenhower Administration’s support of and aid to the Paz 
government contradicted US foreign policy toward Latin America during the Cold 
War.  The MNR government nationalized tin companies, initiated a land reform, 
reduced the strength and influence of the army, and drew support from communist 
organizations.214  If the Eisenhower Administration were to have based its policy 
toward Bolivia on the history of US-MNR relations over the previous decade and a 
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half, Eisenhower officials would have had a negative reaction to the Paz 
government.215  To reiterate this observation, one can note how the decision to 
provide a tin contract and economic assistance to Bolivia in 1953 coincided with 
Eisenhower officials’ first steps to overthrow the Arbenz government.216  US aid 
would allow for the Paz government to realize the revolutionary promises defining 
the Bolivian Revolution and would help sustain the MNR government during the 
coming years.217  Nevertheless, “no ambivalence or ambiguity existed in the minds of 
those who made the 1953 decision to aid the [Bolivian] Revolution.”218  Eisenhower 
officials similarly held little regret in the construction of their policy toward the 
Arbenz government.  How would the nationalist reformist Paz government obtain 
economic assistance from the Eisenhower Administration while those same officials 
undermined the nationalist reformist Arbenz government?  Before discussing how the 
Paz government would ‘earn’ its economic assistance from the Eisenhower 
Administration in 1953, one must review Bolivia’s economic and political 
environment in 1952. 
 During the sexenio, various administrations attempted to lead the country 
following the murder of Villarroel.219  The PIR and other leftist organizations such as 
the Bolivian Communist Party vied with the MNR to gain a political majority, yet the 
MNR dominated the urban labor movement.  In the 1951 elections, Paz (while in 
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exile) and the MNR received 39,000 of the 54,000 votes cast.  When the Bolivian 
army intervened and denied the MNR its victory by claiming that the MNR had a 
communist orientation, the MNR called for an armed uprising.  A diverse range of 
supporters emerged, including miners and middle-class civilians.  After three days of 
fighting, the MNR and Paz moved into the government.220  Under the leadership of 
Paz and Siles, the MNR claimed that its assertion of power in 1952 restored its 
electoral mandate to govern during the elections in 1951.221 
 Truman officials regretted the rise of the MNR government.222  Sanders draws 
parallels between the MNR’s seizure of power in 1942 and the MNR’s seizure of 
power in 1953.  In both cases, the nationalist reformist party toppled a US-supported 
government.  Truman officials had admired the military junta’s prevention of “a coup 
by a candidate (Dr. Víctor Paz Estenssoro) who, characteristically enough, was 
domiciled in Argentina and known to be on close terms with Perón.”223  After noting 
that the delayed recognition of the Paz government would do little to serve US 
objectives in Latin America, the US issued its recognition on June 2, 1952, in a ‘terse’ 
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statement, “The U.S. Chargé d’Affairs, Thomas J. Maleady, at La Paz on June 2 
informed the Foreign Minister of Bolivia, Walter Guevara Arce, of the recogniti n by 
the U.S. Government of the new Government in Bolivia.”  US officials, though, 
emphasized that this recognition did not merit US approval of the Paz government.  
US officials remained cautious of the MNR government.224 
 This hesitation drew in great part from US officials’ perceptions of the MNR 
as a communist organization.  By the 1950s, the ideological challenge to US 
hegemony in Latin America turned from fascism to communism.  Critics of the MNR
thus maneuvered to label the MNR as a communist organization.  Emphasizing the 
leftist influences and programs of the MNR, critics attempted to present the MNR 
now as a communist organization opposed to US interests and leadership.225 
 The Eisenhower Administration would bear the responsibility of determining 
US policy and providing assistance to the Paz government in 1953.  Although the 
Truman Administration had recognized the Paz government, Truman officials 
delayed any official tin agreements.  US recognition aided the Paz government, but 
the allocation of economic and technical assistance still remained uncertain.226  
Eisenhower officials would preoccupy themselves over the ideological orientation of 
the Paz government until an announcement on July 6, 1953, to offer a one-year tin 
contract and a doubling of technical assistance to Bolivia.  In early 1953, though, the 
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Eisenhower Administration had not yet decided to support the Paz government and 
the Bolivian Revolution.227 
 Implementing policies of agrarian reform and nationalization, the Paz 
government limited its rhetoric and presented itself as a moderate government that did 
not challenge the pater-American ideals underpinning the inter-American system.  
One of the most important tenets championed by the Paz government was its respect 
for private property and foreign investment.  The provisional president Hernán Siles 
Suazo quickly promised that the MNR government would honor Bolivia’s 
international obligations and agreements.228  Upon his return to Bolivia, Paz 
emphasized how the MNR was preparing to nationalize the tin mines.  Such rhetoric 
reflected the MNR’s nationalist mission and appealed to the Bolivian populace.  The 
next day, though, Paz quickly modified his rhetoric and proclaimed that the 
revolutionary government would “feel its way carefully.”229  Upon assuming the 
presidency, Paz quickly transformed from a vocal anti-imperialist nationalist to a 
champion of foreign investment.230  Such proclamations targeted US officials and 
their search for a ‘suitable’ government in Bolivia; Paz’s words fell wellithin the 
ideals of pater-Americanism. 
 Paz would reaffirm US officials’ faith in the capability of private enterprise to 
bring development and modernity to Bolivia.  Paz skillfully utilized such an ideal to 
justify the MNR’s nationalization of the tin mines.  Paz articulated that the 
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nationalization of the tin companies would eliminate an oligarchy that had closed off 
the Bolivian economy; the nationalization of the tin mines thus served to create a 
suitable environment for private investment.231  Additionally, Paz reaffirmed that he 
wished for the MNR and the mine owners to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement 
concerning compensation.232  Paz’s calls for ‘just’ compensation and a suitable 
environment for foreign investment were in great part words meant for US officials.  
Siles assured US officials that the goals of the Bolivian Revolution would not oppose 
US investments or private property.  Paz further clarified that the MNR’s 
nationalization policies were limited to the Big Three tin companies.  Bolivian 
ambassador Andrade reassured the US: 
  There is genuine regret that nationalization became nec ssary.  It is our feeling that private 
enterprise, under ordinary circumstance, can more quickly and effectively develop resources 
that can government.  Bolivia’s poverty is a furthe andicap to government exploitation of 
mineral resources.  Nor does my government relish the bad reaction which nationalization has 
caused in some quarters of the United States. 
We badly need and want the help of outside capital.  The billions of dollars in the United 
states that seek profitable outlets, and the unparalleled technical skills which are a formidable 
part of our strength, will be welcome in Bolivia…I repeat, my government will try to create 
an atmosphere which attracts private capital.233 
In contrast to the Arbenz government, the Paz government immediately contested th  
image of the Bolivian Revolution as one of uncontrolled nationalist fervor.  Paz 
officials downplayed the expropriation of the tin companies so as not to portray an 
unguided revolution striking against or hindering private enterprise and foreign 
investments.  Such a presentation incorporated vital characteristics in US foreign 
policy, especially that of the Eisenhower Administration, toward Latin America.  The 
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Paz government appealed to US officials’ belief in the power of US capital to provide 
for the country’s economic development.234 
 Eisenhower policymakers, however, still would not support the MNR 
government.  US officials tied recognition, tin contracts, and economic assistance to 
actual compensation to the Big Three tin companies.  US fears of the nationalization 
of US properties in Latin America weighed heavily upon the minds of Eisenhower 
officials.235  US citizens owned almost a quarter of the Patiño Company.  US 
officials, therefore, could not support the MNR and the Paz government without ‘just’ 
compensation in accordance with US policy and international law.  With this 
understanding, as well as past experience with the power of US support and tin 
purchases, the MNR leadership reached an agreement with the Patiño Company in 
June 1953.  Over the next six months, Eisenhower officials would provide the 
Bolivian government with a tin contract, increased technical assistance, and almost
$10 million in agricultural goods and commodities.236  The Paz government’s efforts 
to pacify US official’s concerns over the trajectory of the Bolivian Revolution prved 
fortuitous.  Whereas the Arbenz government had refused to negotiate any alternative 
compensation agreements with UFCO, the Paz government reached a provisional 
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agreement with a full settlement with US investors less than a year after n tionalizing 
the Big Three companies.  The MNR leadership, including Paz, Siles, and Andrade, 
stressed their commitment to US pater-American policies such as the inter-American 
system.  With these officials’ appeals to the ideals of US foreign policy, especially the 
power of private investment and the composition of a ‘controlled’ revolution, the 
Eisenhower Administration would not perceive the MNR as a threat to the inter-
American system. 
 The MNR leadership’s strategy of obtaining the support of the Eisenhower 
Administration was not limited to private enterprise and compensation.  Within the 
Cold War ideology, opponents of the MNR described the party to US officials as a 
Communist party.  In early 1952, one US policymaker had shared his fears over the 
rise of the MNR and claimed, “The MNR has accepted Communist support and might 
collaborate with the Communists or even fall under their domination if it came to 
power.”237  Another official linked the MNR government to the dangers of a new 
Communist party, “criminal agitation of the Indians of the farms and minds,” and 
“passive or active complicity of certain legal authorities in the Communist 
campaign.”238  Leveled during the Truman Administration, these charges bore 
striking similarity to those provoking US officials’ repression of the Arbenz 
government.  US officials’ initial fears that the Bolivian Revolution would “develop 
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into another Iran” were further complicated when Guatemala was the first country to 
recognize the MNR government.239 
 The Paz government actively resisted any criticisms that the MNR suffered 
from communist subversion.  After the insurrection, Andrade quickly expressed to 
US officials that the MNR was “not Communist.  We give assurances that it is not 
dominated by a foreign government.”240  Siles declared that the coup against the 
military junta was “completely democratic, without any connection with international 
communism.”241  The Paz government refused to allow Communists into the 
government’s leadership and even removed alleged Communists from positions of 
government.242  Such responses to the threat of communist subversion ameliorated 
many US officials’ fears of the ideological orientation of the MNR. 
 The MNR suffered not only from its own leftist policies but the support of 
Communist organizations during the insurrection.243  One of the first Paz officials to 
oppose any labels of communist infiltration resulting from the Partido de la Izquierda 
Revolucionaria (PIR) and other Communist organizations’ participation in the 
Bolivian Revolution was the foreign minister Guevara.  He expressed to US officials:  
When the people of Bolivia were engaged in their final battle against the oligarchy of great 
mine owners and the feudal landholders, the Communists raised their voices with ours.  They 
did us greater harm than good, but in a life-and-death struggle everyone who helps is good, as 
the Western powers proved during the Second World War when they enthusiastically 
welcomed Soviet Russia as an ally.244 
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The Paz government and MNR officials played off the US-USSR alliance during 
World War II to justify PIR support during the insurrection.  Thus, the MNR 
manipulated the US alliance with the Soviet Union to challenge international fascism 
in order to obtain US empathy and support.  MNR officials also utilized its history of 
confrontation with PIR to its favor.  The Movimentistas had blocked the PIR from 
entering into the Villarroel regime.  The PIR responded by participating in the coup 
against Villarroel.  Throughout the sexenio, the PIR often joined the traditional 
parties.  Although the PIR aided the MNR during the 1952 uprising, the MNR 
maintained significant distance from the communist organization.  The PIR’s 
association with the sexenio governments had reduced its membership and 
encouraged many labor organizations and leftists to turn to the MNR and the labor 
groups under the leadership of Juan Lechín.  Without significant membership or a 
more prominent role in the Revolution, the PIR did not command the political 
influence of leftists such as Lechín.  In contrast to its associations and compromises 
with Lechín and his leftist labor supporters, the MNR had no obligation to include the 
PIR in the new Bolivian government.245  While the PIR represented the influence of 
international communism and its attempts to infiltrate the Latin American cou try, 
the MNR gradually came to represent the voice of the Bolivian people, a rival to the 
PIR, and at best the extinct ideological challenge of international fascism.246 
The MNR leadership presented itself to the Eisenhower Administration as a 
legitimate government well within the confines of the inter-American system.  In 
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contrast to the Arbenz government, the Paz government incorporated US 
policymakers’ demands into their considerations.  From compensation to anti-
communism, the MNR leadership maneuvered within pater-Americanism in order to 
obtain the capital necessary to maintain its government and propel the Bolivian 
Revolution.  The MNR government had reflected upon its earlier experiences with 
external US pressure and adeptly applied these lessons into its policies. 
 Once again, assistant secretary John Moors Cabot would typify how US 
policymakers constructed their response to Latin American governments upon the 
compliance of Latin American countries under pater-Americanism.  As he perc iv d 
the Arbenz government as a challenge to US foreign policy, Cabot would serve as 
one of the champions of economic aid to Bolivia.  Cabot believed that aid to Bolivia 
would deter international communism as well as the strength of domestic leftists.  
Furthermore, Cabot linked a humanitarian objective in providing the Bolivian country 
with economic aid to the struggle against communism: 
Given the traditional political pattern there and the grave stresses to which the country is 
subject, chaos seemed certain and a swing to communis  probable if we sat on our 
hands…We face alike the implacable challenge of communism…If we have our reservations 
regarding some of the present Bolivian Government’s measures, we believe it is sincere in 
desiring social progress and in opposing Communist imperialism.247 
In order to aid the Bolivian government, Cabot approached the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, the Treasury Department, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the Export-Import Bank.  Unfortunately for Cabot, the organizations denied Bolivia a 
three-year tin contract and a $10 million loan.  Cabot, though, then approached Foster 
Dulles and claimed that, “if the economy and the present Government [in Bolivia] 
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collapse, the extremists of Communist affiliation may gain control.”  Cabot argued 
that US aid to the Movimentistas was “a comparatively low price to pay if, as we 
believe it can be instrumental in preventing a total breakdown and give Bolivia a 
reasonable change to bring about at least a moderate degree of stability.”248  The 
rhetoric and actions of Paz officials achieved their goals: Foster Dulles approved 
Cabot’s opinion: 
Apart from humanitarian considerations, the United States cannot afford to take either of the 
two risks inherent in such a development: (a) the danger that Bolivia would become a focus of 
Communist infection in South America, and (b) the treat to the United States position in the 
Western Hemisphere which would be posed by the spectacl  of United States indifference to 
the fate of another member of the inter-American community.249 
These prominent Eisenhower officials placed the MNR government as a valuable 
asset to the inter-American system.  A Latin American government that encouraged 
an atmosphere for foreign investment and resisted communist influence merited the 
assistance of the Eisenhower Administration. 
 By far the most important proponent of US assistance to the Paz government 
would be Dr. Milton Eisenhower.  In his analysis of the MNR government in Bolivia, 
Dr. Eisenhower’s ‘sympathy’ for the MNR government rested firmly upon the 
sentiments and solutions already shared by many within the Eisenhower 
Administration that the MNR government sought to fulfill its responsibilities under 
pater-Americanism. 
Dr. Eisenhower’s explanation of the difficulties facing Bolivia and the need 
for US aid combined pater-Americanism with the policies of containment and 
development.  After departing Bolivia, Dr. Eisenhower linked the economic 
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difficulties in Bolivia to hemispheric security.  Emphasizing that his trip was
“beginning [to] develop an integrated view [of] conditions in South America,” Dr. 
Eisenhower telegrammed, “Conditions in Bolivia are unbelievably bad thus creating a 
situation of grave concern to entire hemisphere.”250  Following up on the message, 
Dr. Eisenhower later assured President Eisenhower that the MNR government was 
“by no means communistic.”  Furthermore, he explained, “Should the present 
government fall, it seems probable that it will not [be] succeeded by a communist 
government, nor by a fascist one.  Rather, a period of chaos would set in.”251  As a 
result, Dr. Eisenhower associated any support from the Eisenhower Administration as 
support to an ally that served US interests, rather than a communist country that 
undermined US relations and solidarity with Latin American countries. 
Throughout his observations of Bolivia, Dr. Eisenhower championed an 
approach that resembled the ideas discussed among Eisenhower officials.  In 
describing the MNR government, Dr. Eisenhower emphasized how the Bolivian 
government’s championing of policies of nationalization and reform – which could be 
seen as mirroring those initiated in Iran and Guatemala – was merely “restless in 
tendency.”  The challenges facing Bolivia derived from the country’s inabilty “to get 
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on a sound economic footing.”252  For Dr. Eisenhower, the fears among US officials 
that this government would follow a communist path of progress misrepresented the 
actual nature of the government.  The MNR suffered from the maladies of 
nationalism already mentioned by Dulles.  In such communications, Dr. Eisenhower 
placed the difficulties pertaining to Bolivia as challenges facing policies of 
containment and efforts to achieve hemispheric solidarity, as envisioned by the inter-
American system.  If the MNR government were to fall, the US would simply be 
faced with chaos (rather than opportunity) in the country.  Dr. Eisenhower’s call for 
assistance to Bolivia emerged from the MNR government’s promises to adhere to the 
ideology of the inter-American system. 
Economic development projects united the core proposals of the report since 
the MNR government would welcome such aid and utilize US assistance to promote a 
model Latin American country.  For Bolivia, the country would find its future “as a 
result of the construction of a new highway, financed in large part with an Export-
Import Bank Loan.”253  For Dr. Eisenhower, the policies followed in Bolivia provided 
the solution to Latin America’s economic backwardness.  “If the energies of people 
are properly joined with capital, with incentives for self-betterment, and with stable 
political and economic conditions,” the US would ensure that Latin America would 
pursue a path of modernity and progress attuned to that of the US rather than that of 
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the USSR.254  Dr. Eisenhower championed US assistance to Bolivia, as the Paz 
government maneuvered to appease the expectations of US officials, especially in 
creating an environment for private investment. 
 The Paz government’s success in constructing a dialogue with the Eisenhower 
Administration based on democratic governance, anti-communist ideology, and 
respect for private enterprise is evident in the policies of Cabot and Foster Dulles.  
Because the MNR had proactively incorporated the ideals defining the inter-
American system into its orientation, Cabot and Foster Dulles campaigned for 
economic aid to the Paz government as they called for more aggressive policies 
against the Arbenz government.  Lehman (1997) utilized Cabot’s perception of 
Bolivia and Guatemala to argue that US officials “accepted reform only if not
accompanied by a strong anti-American line, if the reforming government did ot 
appear intransigent in the face of U.S. pressure, and if reform was not directed at U.S. 
interests.255  This thesis argues that Cabot’s and other officials’ interpretations of the 
two Latin American governments stemmed in great part from such characteriz tions.  
Eisenhower officials distinguished between the Arbenz and Paz governments 
because, in their view, only one government complied with the ideals behind the 
inter-American system and pacified US officials’ pater-American preoccupations. 
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 Bolivia’s previous experiences with US foreign policy and assistance allowed 
for Paz to pacify numerous Bolivian actors and placate US officials.256  The Bolivian 
government recognized the value of US assistance.  The loss of such resources during 
a period of political turmoil would further destabilize the nation during the Bolivian 
Revolution.  Paz’s leadership provided for the Bolivian government to shift its 
policies in a manner deemed ‘appropriate’ to US officials without alienating 
important Bolivian support for the Revolution and the MNR government. 
 In contrast to the Arbenz government, the Paz government maneuvered within 
US foreign policy and presented itself as an important addition to the inter-American 
system.  The Movimentistas’ experiences during the previous years derived in grat 
part from the social and economic problems fueling the Bolivian Revolution and the 
external pressure emanating from the US.  US policymakers may have glancd 
superficially over the complex factors defining Bolivian society, but the Paz 
government comprehended the precariousness of its political mandate to guide the 
Revolution.  The MNR leadership, building upon its experiences with US foreign 
policy, conformed to the Eisenhower Administration’s pater-American expectations, 
obtaining significant aid to the Bolivian Revolution. 
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 Various scholars have focused on the Eisenhower Administration’s foreign 
policy toward Latin America to analyze US-Latin American relations during the Cold 
War.  Within the first years of his presidency, Eisenhower and his officials wtnessed 
what they classified as a full-fledged communist invasion in the Western Hemisphere.  
Eisenhower officials feared that, if left unchecked, communist subversion in 
Guatemala would spread throughout Latin America.  The Eisenhower Administration 
thus proceeded with plans to overthrow the Arbenz government and support a 
counter-revolutionary coalition. 
 Scholars have also reflected upon the Eisenhower Administration’s response 
to the Bolivian Revolution.  As they prepared to overthrow a nationalist reformist 
government in Guatemala, Eisenhower policymakers were also preparing to provide 
economic assistance to the nationalist reformist government in Bolivia.  Noting how 
the countries and governments of Arbenz and Paz shared numerous similarities, 
historians classified US policy toward Bolivia as a ‘quiet’ or ‘pragmatic’ experiment 
in foreign policy. 
 This thesis seeks to contribute to the discussion surrounding the reasons why 
the Eisenhower Administration implemented counter-revolutionary policies with 
regard to the Arbenz government in Guatemala while simultaneously contributing 
economic aid to the Paz government in Bolivia.  Building upon the ideology of US 
foreign policy toward Latin America that I have here identified as pater-
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Americanism, the thesis argues that the Eisenhower Administration in 1953 and 1954 
constructed its own foreign policy with regard to Latin America.  The Eisenhower 
Administration framed a policy that sought to revive the inter-American system. 
Demonstrated during World War II, the inter-American system presented a 
united ‘America’ under the paternalistic guidance of the US.  Latin American 
countries provided primary resources and a safe environment for private investment, 
especially that of the US.  In return for hemispheric solidarity and the region’s 
support, US officials implemented programs of economic aid to Latin America and 
spearheaded the defense of its southern neighbors. 
 While the Arbenz government in Guatemala challenged US hegemony, the 
Paz government confirmed its role in the inter-American system and pacified the 
pater-American expectations of US officials.  While US officials perceived 
Guatemalan reforms as fomenting communist subversion, the Bolivian government 
championed policies of private investment and anti-communism.257  Sanders stresses 
that US policymakers characterized the Paz government as the only solution for short-
term security in Bolivia.258  US policy toward Bolivia from World War II to the Cold 
War sought to prop up governments that acknowledged the ideals defining the inter-
American system.  With the threat of international communism looming over the 
region (according to US officials), Eisenhower officials promoted governments that 
promised to serve as deterrents against communism, allies on the international stage, 
and safe havens for foreign investment.  Policymakers, throughout the levels of US 
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bureaucracy, identified these characteristics in the MNR leadership and the Paz 
government. 
The Eisenhower Administration viewed the Arbenz and Paz governments 
through the lens of pater-Americanism.  The Arbenz government’s ‘sins’ included its 
cooperation with communists, its persecution of private investments, its refusal to 
yield to US demands, and its disregard for US leadership in the Cold War.  In 
refusing to capitulate to the expectations of the Eisenhower Administration, the 
Arbenz government diverged from its proscribed role in the inter-American system. 
The MNR leadership, on the other hand, proactively complied with US 
officials and their stipulations for the role of the Paz government.  As Cottam 
emphasizes, the actions of MNR officials did not challenge the paternalistic images of 
Latin America held by many US officials.  The Paz government purposefully 
maneuvered to secure the Eisenhower Administration’s support.  From the cautionary 
approach to nationalization to the anti-communist rhetoric to the protection of private 
investment, the Paz government did not challenge the perception of the inter-
American system held by the Eisenhower Administration or the pater-American 
ideals informing such perceptions. 
In analyzing US officials’ perceptions of the two Latin American governmts 
through documents detailing their discourse, this thesis emphasizes that the US 
policymakers’ approaches to these two governments depended upon each country’s 
conformity to or divergence from the tenets of pater-Americanism.  The Eisenhowr 
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Administration’s approach to US-Latin American relations built upon the established 
ideology, and US officials’ actions merely brought that ideology into the Cold War. 
This thesis’ analysis of the role of pater-Americanism uncovers important 
facets behind the Eisenhower Administration’s policies toward the Arbenz and P z 
governments.  The Arbenz government attempted to embark on a path of self-
determination and did not accept US guidance or Guatemala’s role as an obedient 
country in the system.  Its rhetoric and its actions defied the tenets underpinning the 
inter-American system, for the Guatemalan country refused to appease US officials.  
In contrast to the Guatemalan government, the Paz government directed its rhetoric
and maneuvered within pater-Americanism as the means to appease the Eisenhower 
Administration. 
This thesis’ analysis of US officials’ perceptions of the Guatemalan and 
Bolivian governments through the lens of pater-Americanism provides a significant 
contribution to existing analyses of the Eisenhower Administration’s diverging 
responses to the two Latin American governments.  Some analyses have stressed
domestic factors in the two nations, and others have highlighted the bureaucratic 
framework of US policymaking.  This thesis’ discourse analysis reveals that 
intangible factors played an important role.  An ideology of paternalism informed US 
officials’ perceptions of the two governments.  These perceptions ultimately impacted 
the Eisenhower Administration’s perceptions and contributed to the resulting 
diverging responses. 
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This thesis’ examination revealed important factors behind the Eisenhower 
Administration’s differing responses to the Guatemalan and Bolivian governments.  
The efforts of the Paz government to realize its role in the inter-American system 
assured many US officials, most prominently the experienced John Moors Cabot and 
Dr. Milton Eisenhower.  By examining how these individual actors interpreted the 
words and deeds of the two governments, this thesis exposed how the subjectivity of 
the officials’ decisions depended upon how the two Latin American governments 
conformed to pater-Americanism.  The Arbenz government rebuffed the attempts of 
US officials to ‘guide’ and ‘redirect’ the Guatemalan government along a path of 
governance defined by policies of anti-communism and private investments.  The 
actions and the rhetoric of the two governments differed, so the responses of the 
Eisenhower Administration responded to the two governments differently.  These 
responses transpired precisely because the Paz government maneuvered to appease 
US officials and the Arbenz government challenged pater-Americanism. 
Furthermore, this analysis furthers the discussion of how the Eisenhower 
Administration constructed the foundation for US-Latin American relations during 
the Cold War.  Throughout the Cold War, the US would provide support to 
bureaucratic authoritarian regimes throughout Latin America that presented 
themselves as defenses against communist infiltration, as sources for important 
resources, and as hemispheric allies in the US-led crusade against an opposing idea of 
governance and progress.  By conforming to the inter-American system and pater-
Americanism, these Latin American governments received US guidance in th  pursuit 
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of modernity and furthered the image of paternalism held by US policymakers.  In 
contrast to these governments, those Latin American countries that departe from US-
determined constraints on ‘proper’ self-governance and modernity would endure 
severe US pressure or even US-facilitated counter-revolutionary movements. 
Through the analysis of the Eisenhower Administration’s perceptions of the 
Arbenz and Paz governments in 1953 and 1954, one uncovers the first steps in how 
US officials would approach Latin America throughout the Cold War.  The 
Eisenhower Administration formulated its reactive policy toward Guatemala on the 
premise that the country diverged from its place in the inter-American system, and the 
removal of the Arbenz government would allow for more ‘suitable’ leadership to re-
establish the country’s role.  In response to the conciliatory nature of the Paz 
government, Eisenhower policymakers provided economic assistance supported by 
the belief that such aid would bring progress to the country and ensure hemispheric 
unity in the face of international communism.  For almost 50 years, later US 
administrations would recreate these policies with the same purposes and upon 
similar perceptions.  If a Latin American government were to challenge US 
leadership of the inter-American system, US officials would support counter-
revolutionary movements to secure proper governance for the country, demonstrated 
by the Reagan Administration’s reaction to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.  
Latin American governments that dutifully realized their responsibilities to the inter-
American system were rewarded with significant US aid, as epitomized in the 
Kennedy Administration’s Alliance for Progress. 
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This thesis’ analysis of the Eisenhower Administration’s perceptions of the 
Arbenz and Paz governments in 1953 and 1954 contributes to the scholarly discussion 
of US-Latin American relations during the Cold War.  The Eisenhower 
Administration’s actions served to bring the inter-American system and pter-
Americanism into the Cold War.  The duration of the Cold War would witness US 
officials’ approaching Latin American governments based upon such ideals while 
Latin American governments actively maneuvered within or against this framework. 
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